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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota has a unique approach to handling access to
public records. In 1993, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a law
amending the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
(MGDPA), establishing an unusual method of handling
questions and disputes about access to government data by
authorizing the Minnesota Commissioner of Administration
(Commissioner) to issue written opinions2 on questions relating
to public access to government data3 or disputes with govern-
ment agencies about data practices.4 This article will discuss the
MGDPA and the Commissioner's opinions in the context of
Minnesota administrative law and compare other states' proce-
dures for access to government data and disputes over access.
Although many states have an established procedure for
administrative review of agency decisions,5 this article will focus
1. Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 192, § 38, 1993 Minn. Laws 711, 741-42 (codified as
MINN. STAT. § 13.072 (1994)). The MGDPA was originally enacted in 1974. Act of
April 11, 1974, ch. 479, 1974 Minn. Laws 1199.
2. In this article, the written opinions will be referred to as interpretive opinions,
adjudicative opinions, or opinions.
3. Opinions concerning public access to government data will be referred to as
interpretive opinions.
4. Opinions concerning disputes with government agencies about data practices
will be referred to as adjudicative opinions.
5. See ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 09.25.123 (Michie 1995) (stating that agencies have
rule-making authority to handle disputes about record access and copying); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2li(b) (1) (West Supp. 1995) (covering appeal of agency denial to
Freedom of Information Commission); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1527 (1992) (petition to
Mayor); HAW. REv. STAT. § 92F-15.5 (1996) (appeal to Office of Information Practices);
[Vol. 22
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on the procedures used in Connecticut, 6 New York,7 Utah,8
and the Uniform Code9 only.
II. THE MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT DATA PRACTICES Acr-AN
OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND RIGHTS OF
DATA SUBJECTS
When you come to a fork in the road-take it.
-Casey Stengel
A. Competing Interests
The MGDPA is legislation that regulates the collection,
creation, receipt, maintenance, and dissemination ° of all
government data" maintained by Minnesota state agencies,
12
political subdivisions,"3 and statewide systems'4 such as the
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5 para. 140/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (appeal to head of agency);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.11 (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-53-55 (1991) (requiring
investigation and hearing before members of the central data processing authority);
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 89.4 (McKinney 1995) (requiring appeal to head of agency with
copy to committee on open government); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-403 (Supp. 1995)
(appeal to Records Committee); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 318.(a) (2) (1995) (appeal to
head of agency); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.320 (West 1996) (establishing that
agencies have rule-making authority for review and denial of requests); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-4-203 (1995) (explaining appeal must be made to the district court). Other states
have delegated to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules for access
that may include additional administrative review. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29
§ 10003(b) (1991) (indicating that "it shall be the responsibility of the public body to
establish rules and regulations regarding access to public records.").
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-21i-21j (West 1995).
7. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.4 (McKinney 1995).
8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 6-2-403 (Supp. 1995).
9. UNIF. INFORMATION PRACTICES CODE, 13 U.LA 277 (1986).
10. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 1 (1994).
11. MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 7 (1994) (defining government data as "all data
collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated by any state agency, political
subdivision or statewide system regardless of its physical form, storage media or
conditions of use.").
12. MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 17 (1994) (defining "state agency" as "the state, the
University of Minnesota, and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board,
commission, authority, district or agency of the state."); MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 6
(1995) (defining state agency as "any entity which is given power of statewide effect by
statute or executive order.").
13. Minnesota Statutes § 13.02, subdivision 11 (1994) defines "political subdivision"
as:
any county, statutory or home rule charter city, school district, special district
and any board, commission, district or authority created pursuant to law, local
ordinance or charter provision. It includes any nonprofit corporation which
1996]
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statewide welfare system administered by the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Human Services and the Criminal Justice Information
System. 5  The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he
Act is intended to regulate every aspect of how the government
manages information it collects and records." 6
Almost all open records laws mandate openness in gov-
ernment and access to government information." The MGD-
PA, while containing provisions requiring freedom of informa-
tion or open access to government information," also contains
provisions protecting the privacy interests of citizens who must
is a community action agency organized pursuant to the economic opportunity
act of 1964... to qualify for public funds, or any nonprofit social service
agency which performs services under contract to any political subdivision,
statewide system or state agency, to the extent that the nonprofit social service
agency or nonprofit corporation collects, stores, disseminates, and uses data
on individuals because of a contractual relationship with state agencies,
political subdivisions or statewide systems.
Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subpart 6 (1995) contains a definition of political
subdivision including "those local government entities which are given powers of less
than statewide effect by statute or executive order."
14. Minnesota Statutes § 13.02, subdivision 18 (1994) defines "statewide system" as
"any record keeping system in which government data is collected, stored, disseminated
and used by means of a system common to one or more state agencies or more than
one of its political subdivisions or any combination of state agencies and political
subdivisions." Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subpart 6 (1995) defines a "statewide system"
as:
includ[ing], but not limited to, recordkeeping and data-administering systems
established by statute, federal law, administrative decision or agreement, or
joint powers agreement. 'Statewide systems' shall include, but not be limited
to, Criminal Justice Information System administered by the Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension, the Statewide Accounting System, and the various
welfare systems primarily administered by the Department of Public Welfare.
The Department of Public Welfare is now known as the Department of Human Services.
15. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02 (1994) (defining terms that are used in Minnesota
Government Data Practices Act).
16. Keezer v. Spickard, 493 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
17. Freedom of information acts, open records laws, and other information
practices acts often contain a statement of policy such as the one found in Kansas
Statutes Annotated § 45-216(a) (1994), which states, "[iut is declared to be the public
policy of the state that public records shall be open for inspection by any person unless
otherwise provided by this act and this act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote such policy." Another example is the Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-19-102
(1987), which states that "[i]t is vital in a democratic society that public business be
performed in an open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised of the
performance of public officials and of the decisions that are reached in public activity
and in making public policy."
18. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 1 (1994) (providing that "[a]ll government
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provide private information to various governmental entities
covered by the MGDPA.'9 Because of the elaborate and
comprehensive classification scheme, the provision that requires
openness works more as a default provision than a statutory
presumption.
The goals of openness in government and protection of
privacy cannot both be accomplished without some sacrifice to
each."° The determination of where the public's right to know
ends and the individual's right to privacy begins involves drawing
lines that may seem obvious in cases where either the goal of
openness in government or protection of privacy is unquestion-
ably paramount, but becomes increasingly difficult in cases where
there are strong state interests in both an individual's right to
privacy and the public's need to monitor its government. This
tension is apparent when considering personnel information
about police officers and other law enforcement officials. A
police officer is a public official,21 and Minnesota, like most
states, recognizes that the public has a right to know certain
information about its public officials such as their names, salaries
and qualifications.22 The Legislature also recognized recently
19. MINN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 2 (1994). The statute provides as follows:
An individual asked to supply private or confidential data concerning the
individual shall be informed of: (a) the purpose and intended use of the
requested data within the collecting state agency, political subdivision, or
staLewide system; (b) whether the individual may refuse or is legally required
to supply the requested data; (c) any known consequence arising from
supplying or refusing to supply private or confidential data; and (d) the
identity of other persons or entities authorized by state or federal law to
receive the data.
Id. Minnesota Statutes § 13.05, subdivision 4 (1994) places restrictions on use of data
collected about individuals. Minnesota Statutes § 13.05, subdivision 5 (1994) requires
governmental entities to establish appropriate security and safeguards for records
containing data on individuals.
20. This tension has been discussed in many places. See, e.g.,JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN
& ROBERT F. BoucHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY
ACTs, (2d ed. 1995); Dale F. Rubin, State Government Records and Individual Privacy:
Theoretical and Comparative Approaches, 26 URB. LAw. 589, 589-90 (1994) (stating that at
"both the federal and state levels there is a continuing interplay between Freedom of
Information Act type statutes and provisions prohibiting disclosure of 'private
information.'").
21. Minnesota Statutes § 13.43, subdivision 1 (1994) defines personnel data in
pertinent part to include "data on individuals collected because the individual is or was
an employee of ... a state agency, statewide system or political subdivision .... "
22. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 2 (1994) (stating that data about public
employees is accessible to any member of the public); see also Minneapolis Fed'n
Teachers, AFL-CIO, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Special Sch. Dist., 512 N.W.2d
1996]
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that public access to personal identifying information about a
police officer who has been working in an undercover capacity,
not only undermines the officer's ability to work effectively, but
increases the danger to the officer as well.2 As a result of
weighing these competing interests, the Legislature extended the
time during which personnel information about an undercover
police officer may not be released to the public.24
A third public interest provided for in many states' freedom
of information acts25 and the Minnesota Rules on Data Practic-
es26 is the public's interest in the orderly and efficient opera-
tion of government. This goal is balanced against the public's
right of access in statutes that set strict limits on the turnaround
time for information requests,27 but allow the time limits to be
107, 112 (Minn. CL App. 1994) (stating that the Legislature weighed privacy rights and
public's right to know in determining which personnel disciplinary data is public).
23. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 5 (1994) (classifying information about
undercover officers as private). Personnel data about undercover officers is to remain
not public so as to protect the officer's safety and any ongoing criminal investigation.
Act ofJune 1, 1995, ch. 259, art. 1, § 8, 1995 Minn. Laws 2739, 2742-43.
24. Act of June 1, 1995, ch. 259, art. 1, § 8, 1995 Minn. Laws 2739, 2742-43.
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203(1) (1990) (requiring records custodians to
make rules and regulations for inspection of records as are reasonably necessary to
protect records and prevent "unnecessary interference with regular discharge of the
duties of the custodian or his office."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1522(d) (1992) (extending
response time for an access request if records are voluminous or if there is a need for
consultation before release); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5 para. 140/3(f) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(stating agency may deny burdensome request); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-218(e) (1994)
(explaining a request may be denied if unreasonable burden or a reason to believe
repeated requests intended to disrupt other essential functions); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.872(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (refusing access if unreasonable burden or
intent by requester disrupts essential functions of agency); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§ 408 (West 1989) (declaring access can be limited so as not to disrupt regular activities
of agency); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51 § 24A.5.5 (West 1996) (explaining that an agency
can prevent excessive disruption of essential functions); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342
(Michie 1995) (stating that a court may grant agency additional time to respond if
extraordinary volume and response would prevent the public body from meeting
operational responsibilities); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.290 (West 1996) (providing
that agencies shall adopt rules on access to prevent excessive interference with other
essential functions of an agency).
26. MINN. R. 1205.0100, subp. 2 (1995). The rule states, in part, that "[this
chapter is intended to guide entities so that while protection is given to individual
privacy, neither necessary openness in government nor the orderly and efficient opera-
tion of government is curtailed." Id.
27. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-203 (West 1990 and Supp. 1995)
(stating that if records are in active use or storage, custodian shall inform requester and
set time and date within three days for inspection); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21i(a)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (requiring four business days for denial and allowing 10
business days for public personnel or medical files); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1522 (c) (1981)
[Vol. 22
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changed where the information request would result in an
unwarranted interference with the agency's primary function.
28
Extensions are often granted when a considerable amount of
information is requested or the files are in use.29
(giving 10 working days from request); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-70(f) (1994) (giving
three business days to decide if access is allowed); IDAHO CODE § 9-339(1) (1990)
(requiring a grant or denial of request within three working days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
5, para. 140/3(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring decision within seven working days of
request); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-218(d) (1993) (requiring decision within three business
days of request); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.880(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994)
(requiring decision within three business days of request); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:32.D. (West 1982) (requiring decision within three days of request); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 409(1) (West 1989) (requiring decision within five working days of
request); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-614(b)(1) (1995) (requiring decision
within 30 days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10(b) (West 1988) (requiring decision
within 10 days of request); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.235(2) (West 1994) (requiring
decision within five days of request); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-5(1) (1991) (requiring
decision within one day of written request); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.023(3) (Vernon
1988) (requiring decision within three business days of request); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 14-
2-8(D) (Michie 1995) (requiring decision no later than 15 days after request); N. Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney 1995) (requiring response within five days); TEx.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.221 (d) (West 1994 and Supp. 1996) (requiring decision within
10 days of request); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-204(3) (1993) (requiring decision within
10 days or five days if record requested benefits the public); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
342(A) (Michie 1995) (requiring decision within five days plus an additional seven if
"practically impossible"); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.320 (1996) (requiring decision
within two business days of request); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-3(4) (1993) (requiring
decision within five business days of request); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.35(4) (1995)
(requiring decision as soon as practicable).
28. See supra note 26.
29. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 140/3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (extending time
to respond by seven days for specified reasons); IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.8(4) (West 1994)
(defining and allowing good faith delay); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.872(5) (Michie/-
Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (allowing three day delay if file in active use); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:33.B (West 1982) (setting date within three additional days if file in use); Md.
CODE ANN. STATE GOV'T § 10-614(b) (4) (1995) (providing for extension of not more
than 30 days with consent of applicant); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 15.235(2) (d) (West
1994) (allowing 10 additional days in unusual circumstances as defined in § 15.232);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-5(1) (1991) (allowing up to 14 days if needed); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 610.023 (Vernon 1988) (allowing extension beyond three business days for
reasonable cause); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-8 (Michie 1995) (allowing response with
time available within three days); N. Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney 1995)
(providing that a response to request may be to set later date when access available);
S. C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(c) (Law. Co-Op. 1991) (allowing 15 days for response); TEx.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.221 (d) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that if a request cannot
be produced, a reasonable date will be set for access); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-204(3)
(1993) (allowing extension for extraordinary purposes as defined in § 63-2-204(4))
(1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 318(a)(5) (1995) (extending time in defined unusual
circumstances); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-3(4) (1993) (allowing date to be set beyond five
days); see also supra note 26. But see MINN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 3 (1994) (providing that
1996]
7
Westin: The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act: A Practitioner's Gui
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
W!LLIAM M/TC-FELL LAW REVIEW
B. Categories and Classification System
The federal government and the various states have several
ways of dealing with the inherent conflict among these important
public goals of openness in government, protection of privacy
interests, and the orderly and efficient operation of govern-
ment. o The Minnesota Legislature has expressly drawn the
lines between access and privacy"1 and between unlimited access
and efficient operation.' The MGDPA establishes a system in
which every type of information maintained by any state or local
governmental entity is broadly categorized.33 These categories
typically include the identity of the agency gathering the
information or the reason the information was gathered, such as
educational data 4 or law enforcement data. Each piece of
information within the broad categories is then classified. 6
responsible authority shall comply with any request within five days unless unable to
comply, and then will have five additional days to comply with the request).
30. See generally FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 20, at § 1; infra notes 37-51 and
accompanying text.
31. See Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub.
Sch., Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
an example of the Legislature's balancing of interests is "evident in its decision to make
only the 'status and existence' of a charge public data before a final disposition
occurs").
32. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 3 (1994) (allowing responsible authority or
designee to require the requesting person to pay the actual costs of searching for and
retrieving government data).
33. See generally Donald A. Gemberling & Gary A. Weissman, Data Privacy: Eveiything
You Wanted to Know About the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act -From "A" to "Z", 8
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 573, 578-82, 590 (1982) (stating that the Minnesota Government
Data Practices Act is an imperfect method for dealing with public access to personal
data and descriptions of governmental operations).
34. MINN. STAT. § 13.32, subd. 1(a) (1994) (defining educational data as "data on
individuals maintained by a public educational agency or institution or by a person
acting for the agency or institution which relates to a student.").
35. Minnesota Statutes § 13.82, subdivision 1 (1994) defines law enforcement
agencies as:
agencies which carry on a law enforcement function, including but not limited
to municipal police departments, county sheriff departments, fire departments,
the bureau of criminal apprehension, the Minnesota state patrol, the board of
peace officer standards and training, the department of commerce, and the
department of labor and industry fraud investigation unit.
36. See Glenda D. Spiotta, Local Government Compliance Issues: Minnesota's Open
Meeting Law and Data Practices Act, 12 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 117, 120-23 (1991)
(stating that the focus of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act is to protect the
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The Legislature initially divided the universe of govern-
mental data into two main classifications: data on individuals and
data not on individuals.3 7 Each of these two classifications was
divided into three subclasses.' Data on individuals were
classified as either public data on individuals, 9 private data on
individuals,' or confidential data on individuals.4  Data not
on individuals were divided into three parallel classifications:
public data not on individuals,4' nonpublic data,4' and protect-
ed nonpublic data." The Legislature also created a hybrid
category of summary data.45 Summary data is based on private
or confidential data from which all identifying characteristics
have been removed.' Once the information that could identify
a data subject has been removed, there are no longer any privacy
rights to protect, and summary data are public.47
The Legislature added another broad category of informa-
tion in 1985 when it created the category of data on dece-
dents.' Prior to that time, because "individual" was defined as
37. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subds. 4, 5 (1994).
38. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 15 (1994) (defining "public data on individuals"
as data that is accessible to the public pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 13.03).
40. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 12 (1994) (defining "private data on individuals"
as data that is made by statute or federal law applicable to the data (a) not public, and
(b) accessible to the individual subject of that data).
41. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 3 (1994) (defining confidential data on
individuals as "data which is made not public by statute or federal law applicable to the
data and is inaccessible to the individual subject of that data.").
42. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 14 (1994) (defining public data not on
individuals as "data which is accessible to the public pursuant to § 13.03.").
43. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 9 (1994) (defining nonpublic data as "data not
on individuals which is made by statute or federal law applicable to the data: (a) not
public; and (b) accessible to the subject, if any, of the data.").
44. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 13 (1994) (defining protected nonpublic data
as "data not on individuals which is made by statute or federal law applicable to the data
(a) not public and (b) not accessible to the subject of the data.").
45. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 19 (1994) (defining summary data as "statistical
records and reports derived from data on individuals but in which individuals are not
identified and from which neither their identities nor any other characteristic that could
uniquely identify an individual is ascertainable."). Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subpart
16 (1995) expands on this definition to include "data which has been extracted,
manipulated, or summarized from private or confidential data, and from which all data
elements that would link the data to a specific individual have been removed."
46. MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 16 (1995).
47. MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 9 (1994).
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a living person,49 data about decedents was not specifically
classified and, therefore, under the default provision of the
MGDPA ° became public data. The treatment of data on
decedents is similar to that of data on individuals, and decedent
data classifications mirror classification of data on living per-
sons.
51
The statute prescribes access rules for each classification of
data, according to assigned definitions. For example, public data
on individuals is defined in pertinent part as "data which is
accessible to the public."5 2 Data which are classified as public
(for either individuals or other entities) are accessible to anyone
because they are defined as such.53 As a general matter, data
that are classified as private data on individuals or nonpublic are
accessible only to the subject of the data. 4 Finally, data that
are classified as confidential or protected nonpublic data are
data that are unavailable to the data subject55 but accessible to
government employees who must have access to the information
49. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 8 (1994) (defining individual as a "natural
person," which includes a parent or guardian in the case of a minor or someone
adjudged mentally incompetent); MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 8 (1995) (defining an indi-
vidual as "any living human being").
50. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 1 (1994) (stating that all government data not
otherwise classified is public).
51. Compare MINN. STAT. § 13.10, subd. 1(a) (1994) (providing that confidential
data on decedents is data which was classified as confidential prior to the death of the
data subject) with MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 3 (1994) (providing that confidential data
on individuals is inaccessible to the individual subject of the data); compare MINN. STAT.
§ 13.10, subd. 1(b) (1994) (providing that private data on decedents is classified as
private prior to the death of the subject) with MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 12 (1994)
(providing that private data on individuals, be made "(a) not public, and (b) accessible
to the individual subject of that data.").
52. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 15 (1994) (defining public data on individuals
as "data which is accessible to the public in accordance with the provisions of§ 13.03.").
53. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 1 (1994) (defining public data as "all
government data collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated by a state
agency, political subdivision or statewide system," unless specified otherwise by state or
federal law).
54. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subds. 9, 12 (1994) (defining nonpublic data not on
individuals as "data not on individuals that is made by statute or federal law applicable
to the data: (a) not accessible to the public; and (b) accessible to the subject, if any,
of the data."); see also MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 9 (1995) (defining private data to
include only data expressly classified by either a state statute, including Minnesota
Statutes § 13.06 (1994), or federal law).
55. See MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subds. 3, 13 (1994) (defining confidential data that is
made not public by statute or federal and is inaccessible to the subject of the data).
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in order to do their jobs5 6
When first enacted, the statute did not provide categories
and classifications for each type of information, but relied on
categories and classifications used elsewhere in Minnesota law.57
As discussed in Section I-C below, the legislation and later
administrative rules provided guidance to governments attempt-
ing to impose the MGDPA requirements on collecting, creating,
receiving, maintaining, and disseminating government informa-
tion.
In addition to setting up categories of information and a
system to classify all government data, the Minnesota Legislature
reserved for itself the monumental task of classifying each piece
of information as either public, private, confidential, nonpublic,
protected nonpublic, summary, or data on decedents.' A
statutory scheme that attempts to classify every type of informa-
tion collected, created, received, maintained, and disseminated
by hundreds of different government offices and contractors is
going to have shortcomings. Some pieces of information are
going to be unclassified. Some are going to fit into more than
one classification. The Commissioner of Administration, in
reviewing a dispute over access to government data, stated:
The basic operational logic of the MGDPA, particularly in the
variety of specific statutory provisions that define and then
classify various types of data, can often lead to situations in
which the exact same data can be classified as private by one
section of the MGDPA and as confidential by another sec-
tion.
5 g
It seems obvious that:
56. See MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 3 (1995) (explaining that data is confidential if
provided by state statute or federal law).
57. MiNN. STAT. § 13.99, subd. 1 (1994). See generally Gemberling & Weissman,
supra note 33, at 581-82.
58. Since it was enacted, the MGDPA has been amended every year, adding many
categories with specific classifications for data in each category. See MINN. STAT. § 13.99
(1994). See generally Gemberling & Weissman, supra note 33. The Minnesota Supreme
Court noted that "[t]he scope of data which can properly be made public is almost
always defined by statute." Doe v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 435 N.W.2d 45, 50
(Minn. 1989).
59. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-008, at 10 (1993). Minnesota Statutes § 13.072
(1994) requires distribution of the opinions. The Minnesota Department of
Administration distributes copies of opinions periodically to people who have asked to
be on a mailing list for that purpose. In addition, selected opinions are occasionally
published in Finance Y.' Commre, the state's legal newspaper.
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It is probably not possible to draft statutory provisions which
will set forth, with a requisite specificity, clear and unambigu-
ous standards regarding when a record is deemed so private
as to preclude disclosure.... [I]nformation technology is
changing so rapidly that no statute can anticipate the uses to
which information derived by such technology will be
employed. Thus, broad standards employing a public interest
versus personal privacy weighing test, or language referring to
a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy' may be necessary
to enable courts and public agencies to retain the flexibility
they need to decide upon future requests for such informa-
tion on a case-by-case basis.'
Because of these difficulties, it is helpful to look to guidelines to
statutory construction found in the MGDPA.
C. Construction
The MGDPA contains several guidelines to construction and
implementation of the Act. The first is a presumption that
government data is public "unless classified by statute, or
temporary classification pursuant to section 13.06, or federal law"
as not public.6 A general statement of this type is found in all
but one state's freedom of information statutes and makes
explicit the goals of the laws.62 These statutes often include a
60. Rubin, supra note 20, at 595.
61. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 1 (1994) (stating that an authority in every state
agency, political subdivision, and statewide system "shall keep records containing
government data" to make them "easily accessible for convenient use.").
62. SeeALA. CODE§ 36-12-40 (1991);ALASKASTAT. ANN. § 09.25.110 (Michie 1995);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121.01.D (1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a) (Michie
1992); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253(a) (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-201 (1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 10003 (1991); D.
C. CODE ANN. § 1-1522 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.07 (West 1995); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 92F-11 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-338 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 140/3 (Smith-
Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-3 (West 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2 (West
1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.872 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:32 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1989); MD. CODE ANN. STATE
GOV'T, § 10-613 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West 1988); MICH. COMP.
LAwS ANN. § 15.233 (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-5 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-6-102 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.01 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1994);
N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A.4 (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 47:1A-2 (1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-1 (Michie 1995); N. Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 132-6 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 149.43(B) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.2 (West 1988); OR. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 192.420 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65 § 66.2 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-
2-3 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30 (Law. Co-Op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-
12
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policy statement and rationale that citizens need to be informed
of the workings of their government. The MGDPA contains no
specific rationale for the presumption that government informa-
tion is public unless otherwise classified and does not specify
whether the statute should be strictly or liberally construed.'3
Any court or administrative body required to weigh competing
interests under the statute is left to infer the goals of the
legislation.'
The MGDPA is fundamentally different from other state
statutes and the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in
its approach to meeting the competing goals of openness,
protection of privacy, and efficient government.65 Unlike the
FOIA and other states' open records laws, the exceptions to the
general requirement of open access are stated in specific
terms. 6 While the FOIA prohibits disclosure that would
constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,"67 the
27-1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (1992); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001,
.021(b) (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-201 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 316
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.260
(West 1991); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-3 (1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (West 1986); WyO.
STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203 (1992). Georgia's statute is the only one not making this
statement explicitly.
63. Cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.871 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (providing that
exceptions are strictly construed); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.011 (1988) (providing that
exceptions are strictly construed); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-712.01(3) (1995)
(providing that right to access is liberally construed). Indeed, with the structure of the
MGDPA, it would be next to impossible to define which sections should be liberally or
strictly construed.
64. See Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 29 n.2 (Minn.
1989) (declaring that privacy rights need to be protected); Northwest Publications, Inc.
v. City of Bloomington, 499 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
information generally should be released); Pathmanathan v. St. Cloud State Univ., 461
N.W.2d 726, 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the statute's purpose is to allow
access to government records).
65. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
66. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) with sources cited supra note 62 (referring
to the interplay between the Freedom of Information Act and provisions prohibiting
disclosure of private information).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (6) (1988). New York law contains the same provision. The
Executive Director of the New York Committee on Open Government noted that:
[a] lthough the provision might be considered vague, it is also flexible, and it
was agreed at the [National Privacy and Public Policy] Symposium [in
Hartford, Connecticut, in 1995] that flexibility is necessary to accommodate
changes in society and because the facts in any given situation may determine
the extent to which release of information would result in an unwarranted
invasion of privacy. In short, despite the inability to define what an unwarrant-
ed invasion of privacy might be, that standard was considered to be appropri-
19961
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Minnesota Legislature has essentially defined "unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." Data that might fit this description
under the FOIA is classified as private, or possibly confidential,
under the MGDPA.' By establishing this rigid classification
scheme, the Legislature has drawn many precise lines to
determine which information is public and which information
may not be released to the public. One example of this is the
change in privacy interests determined by the Legislature
between an applicant for a license and that same person after a
license is granted. The Legislature determined, in essence, that
it is an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to release to the
public information about an applicant for a professional license,
thus classifying much information about license applicants as
private. Nevertheless, it decided it is not an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy to release some of the same data
once the person has been licensed.69 This is accomplished by
classifying some data on license applicants as private, but
classifying the same data on licensees as public.70 This precise
line drawing by the legislature leaves no room for agency
officials to determine if information should be released to the
public and very little room to construe the statute. Once an
agency identifies the category of information, the statute will
specify to whom it may be released."
This lack of flexibility in Minnesota's system has predictable
results. Inevitably conflicts over classifications occur, and the
MGDPA needs to be construed to resolve these conflicts.72 The
MGDPA includes sections governing construction in situations
where more than one classification appears to fit a piece of
information.7" Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision
ate and necessary due to its adaptability.
State of N.Y., Department of State, Committee on Open Government: 1995 Report to
the Governor and the Legislature, Dec. 1995, at 5.
68. MINN. STAT. § 13.41, subds. 2, 3 (1994).
69. Compare MINN. STAT. § 13.41, subd. 4 (1994) (defining public data) with MINN.
STAT. § 13.41, subd. 2 (1994) (defining private data).
70. MINN. STAT. § 13.41, subds. 2, 4 (1994).
71. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
72. See Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 33-34 (Minn.
1989). The court stated that "we fully realize that the statutes we have considered in
this opinion [MINN. STAT. §§ 13.03, subd. 4, 13.43, 471.705] may be open to differing
interpretations. Our opinion, however, is an attempt to reconcile honestly all applicable
statutes without judicial legislation." Id.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 74-82.
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4(a) directs that the classification of government data change if
it is required to do so to comply with either judicial or adminis-
trative rules or with a specific statute.7 4 This subsection recog-
nizes that the judicial branch, other states, and the federal
government all have separate and separately authorized schemes
governing classification of data for which each is responsible.75
Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(a) also recognizes
that data may change categories, and thus necessarily classifica-
tions, after it is collected.76
A second statute governing construction in the MGDPA is
found in Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(b),77
which establishes a presumption that data is private if it is
classified as both private and confidential by any law.7' At first
glance, Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(b)
appears to conflict with Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(a). Both subsections (a) and (b) refer to "classi-
fication" of data, with subsection (a) directing that the classifi-
cation change when there is a conflict, and subsection (b)
directing that the classification always change to private when
there is a conflict.79 The two sections can be reconciled,
however, by referring to Minnesota Rules chapter 1205, the
Rules on Data Practices promulgated by the Department of
Administration pursuant to authority granted in Minnesota
Statutes section 13.07.0
74. Minnesota Statutes § 13.03, subdivision 4(a) (1994) states:
Change in classification of data.
(a) The classification of data in the possession of an agency shall change if it
is required to do so to comply with either judicial or administrative rules
pertaining to the conduct of legal actions or with a specific statute applicable
to the data in the possession of the disseminating or receiving agency.
75. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd 4(a) (1994).
76. See Doe v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 435 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. 1989)
(construing MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4 (1986) to provide that "[i]n limited situations
administrative rules and judicial rules pertaining to the conduct of legal actions can
operate to change the classification of data.").
77. Minnesota Statutes § 13.03, subdivision 4(b) (1994) states: "If data on
individuals is classified as both private and confidential by this chapter, or any other
statute or federal law, the data is private."
78. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(b) (1994).
79. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(a)(b) (1994).
80. The rules were promulgated in the early 1980s. Minnesota Statutes § 13.03,
subdivision 4(a) was enacted in 1980. Act of April 24, 1980, ch. 603, 1980 Minn. Laws
1145. Subsections (b) and (c) of§ 13.03 were enacted in 1984. Act of April 24, 1984,
ch. 436, 1984 Minn. Laws 135.
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Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subpart 3 attempts to reconcile
statutes that define government information as "confidential,"
but treat the information as private data on individuals as that
term is defined in the MGDPA.81 Minnesota Rule 1205.0200,
subpart 3 states that "[d] ata is confidential only if a state statute
or federal law provides substantially that certain data shall not be
available either to the public or to the data subject."8 2  This is
further clarified in Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subpart 9, which
provides "[d]ata is private if a state statute or federal law
provides substantially that: ... E. Certain data is confidential, but
the context of the statute or federal law in which the term
confidential appears reasonably indicates the data is accessible by
the individual who is the subject of the data."" With this
administrative clarification, Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(a) and Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivi-
sion 4(b) can be reconciled. Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(b) applies when a statute defines a term as
confidential without reference to the definitions in the MGDPA,
however context indicates that the data would be private under
the term as it is defined in the MGDPA.84 Minnesota Statute
81. MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 3 (1995).
82. MINN. R. 1205.0200 (1995). The definition of "confidential data" found in
Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subpart 3 (1995) reads in full as follows:
Confidential data "Confidential data," as defined in Minnesota Statutes, section
13.02, subdivision 3 shall only include data which is expressly classified as
confidential by either a state statute, including the provisions of Minnesota
Statutes, section 13.06, or federal law.
Data is confidential only if a state statute or federal law provides
substantially that certain data shall not be available either to the public or to
the data subject; or certain data shall not be available to anyone for any reason
except agencies which need the data for agency purposes. Certain data shall
be confidential if a state statute or federal law provides that the data may be
shown to the data subject only at the discretion of the person holding the
data, and if such state statute or federal law provides standards which limit the
exercise of the discretion of the person maintaining the data.
Data is not confidential if a state statute or federal law provides that the
data is confidential, but the context of the statute or federal law, in which the
term confidential appears, reasonably indicates the data is accessible by the
data subject, or if the data subject is given access to the data only upon the
discretion of the person holding the data and the state statute or federal law
does not provide any standards which limit the exercise of such discretion. In
such cases, the proper classification of the data is private.
A state agency rule, an executive order, an administrative decision, or a
local ordinance shall not classify data as 'confidential' or use wording to make
data inaccessible to the data subject unless there is a state statute or federal
law as the basis for the classification.
83. MINN. R. 1205.0200, subp. 9 (1995).
84. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(b) (1994).
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section 13.03, subdivision 4(a)85 applies to change the classifica-
tion when the data is placed in a different category of data, or
when data is moved from one entity to another where use may
change.86 Classification may change either from confidential
to private, or from private to confidential or any other category
if required by law or judicial rule. 7
Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(b) is
necessary given the rigid structure of the MGDPA and the
changing needs of government. For instance, investigative data
are confidential or protected nonpublic data.' The classifica-
tion of data collected for an investigation changes to public
(unless otherwise classified) when the investigation is closed.89
The investigation may reopen, changing the data classification
from public back to confidential.' Minnesota Statutes section
13.03, subdivision 4(a) allows the classifications to be consistent
with the data's current use.
A third guideline to construction of the MGDPA is found in
Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(c),91 which
provides that data maintains the same classification when
transmitted from one entity to another.92 Again, this subsection
appears to conflict with Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(a). Data transmitted from one entity to another
cannot both change classification as required by Minnesota
Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(a), and keep the same
classification, as required by Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(c). The conflict is illustrated by arrest warrants
and arrest warrant indices. Arrest warrants issued by courts are
85. See supra note 74.
86. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(a) (1994).
87. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4 (1994).
88. MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 2 (1994) (defining and classifying civil investigative
data). Further, Minnesota Statutes § 13.82, subdivision 5, defines investigative data in
criminal matters.
89. See MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 3 (1994) (describing civil investigative data);
MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subd. 5 (1994) (describing law enforcement investigative data).
90. MINN. STAT. §§ 13.39, subd. 3, 13.82, subd. 5 (1994).
91. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(c) (1994). This section states that:
[t]o the extent that government data is disseminated to state agencies, political
subdivisions, or statewide systems by another state agency, political subdivision,
or statewide system, the data disseminated shall have the same classification in
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public in most court files. The warrants are indexed and
compiled for law enforcement purposes by county sheriffs'
offices. Once the individual arrest warrants have been compiled
and placed in arrest warrant indices in law enforcement
agencies, the information on each warrant is classified as
confidential." The apparent conflict between the classifications
is resolved by applying Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(c) only in instances where the data is not already
classified, and applying Minnesota Statutes section 13.03,
subdivision 4(a) if a specific classification exists in the receiving
agency. This interpretation is consistent with the general
legislative direction that statutes be construed to give meaning
to the entire statute.94
In summary, Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivision
4,95 reveals a statutory construction scheme that fills in some
gaps and answers some questions when specific information
appears to have either more than one classification or none at
all.
Minnesota Statutes section 13.03 also contains additional
guidelines of general applicability to data maintained by
government entities. A court may order that no public data be
released after an in-camera inspection in accordance with
statutorily-outlined procedures.96 In addition, the Legislature
has directed that data classification will change to conform with
changes in the law.97
D. Applying Classifications and Determining Who Has Access
Identifying the correct classification is only the first step in
determining whether access to particular data is allowed. Data
93. See MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subd. 12 (1994).
94. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1994).
95. The 1996 Minnesota Legislature amended MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4, to add
subdivision 4(d). This section states:
[i]f a state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision disseminates data
to another state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision, a classifica-
tion provided for by law in the hands of the entity receiving the data does not
affect the classification of the data in the hands of the entity that disseminates
the data.
Act of April 11, 1996, ch. 440, 1996 Minn. Laws 868. This section, which became
effective August 1, 1996, appears to cover the same cases governed by MINN. STAT. §
13.03, subd. 4(a) from the perspective of the disseminating agency.
96. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subds. 6, 8 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
97. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 9 (1994).
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classified as private, confidential, nonpublic, or protected
nonpublic must be analyzed to determine who can have access
to information that is not public.98 In most instances, the
various statutes that list categories of information, such as welfare
data,99 corrections and detention data," or law enforcement
data,10' also identify those who can access information that is
not public. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 13.46,
subdivision 2 (a) lists twenty categories of people other than the
data subject who can have access to welfare data about an
individual.1
0 2
In addition to the specific listings of people with access to
various categories and classifications of data, the MGDPA
contains some general provisions regarding access. A data
subject may give informed consent to release private data to
another specified entity." Finally, some laws allowing access
exist outside the MGDPA.
10 4
If an agency recognizes that another classification for data
is more appropriate than the one assigned (or not assigned) by
the Legislature, the agency can either apply to the Minnesota
Department of Administration for temporary classification of that
data l 5 or to the courts for an order overriding the classifica-
tion."' Neither avenue leads to permanent classification ofdata. 107
98. See MINN. STAT. § 13.05, subd. 4 (1994).
99. See MINN. STAT. § 13.46 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
100. See MINN. STAT. § 13.85 (1994).
101. See MINN. STAT. § 13.82 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
102. MINN. STAT. § 13.46, subd. 2(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
103. See MINN. R. 1205.0400, subp. 2 (1995) (allowing the data to be released by
"express written direction").
104. SeeMINN. STAT. § 241.441 (1994) (permitting the ombudsman of the Minnesota
State Department of Corrections to have access to corrections, detention, and medical
data).
105. See MINN. STAT. § 13.06 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
106. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(a) (1994).
107. Any temporary classification expires and must be adopted by the Legislature
as part of the statute. MINN. STAT. § 13.06, subd. 7 (1994 & Supp. 1995). Any
classification by the courts applies only to the specific piece of information before the
court and not to the type of data generally. See Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274
N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota Supreme Court stated as follows:
[Minnesota statutes allowing public records to be available to the public except
as expressly determined by law] evidence legislative intent to retain full control
of public access to information. The power to restrict access is given to
administrative agencies only in emergency situations, and even that power is
subject to legislative action. No power to restrict access is given to the courts.
1996]
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E. Other Rights of a Data Subject
1. Tennessen Warning
The MGDPA not only regulates who may have access to
government data, but also sets out procedural requirements for
the collection of private or confidential data from the data
subjects.' The law requires that when a governmental entity
asks an individual to supply private or confidential data about
himself or herself, the government shall inform the individual
about the following:
(a) the purpose and intended use of the requested data
within the collecting state agency, political subdivision, or
statewide system;
(b) whether the individual may refuse or is legally required
to supply the requested data;
(c) any known consequence arising from supplying or
refusing to supply private or confidential data; and
(d) the identity of other persons or entities authorized by
state or federal law to receive the data.'
This requirement is applicable to all collection of private or
confidential information from an individual about himself or
herself, except when a law enforcement officer is conducting an
investigation and asking an individual to supply investigative
data.' To implement this requirement, a governmental entity
must know the classification of the information at the time it is
being collected, and must be able to predict accurately the
parties with whom the information may be shared, and the use
to which it will be put. In the case of an individual asked to
supply welfare data, the Tennessen Warning would necessarily
include all of the twenty types of individuals who would be able
to receive the information under Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 13.46, subdivision 2.111
2. Appeal Accuracy and Completeness of Data
Another function of the MGDPA is to provide individuals
108. See MiNN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 2 (1994).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
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with information that the government has about them.' l The
MGDPA describes the subject of data's right to be informed
about whether he or she is the subject of stored data, as well as
the data's classification and the content and meaning of the
data. It also provides a procedure for contesting the accuracy
and completeness of the data, and for possibly changing the da-
ta.113  To contest the accuracy and completeness of the data,
an individual must first appeal to the responsible authority1 14
within each entity that maintains the data, and then appeal to
the Department of Administration." 5 The Department of
Administration is required to attempt to resolve any disputes
without holding a contested case hearing.11 6
III. DISPUTES/REMEDIES
A. Judicial Remedies
Since its inception, the MGDPA has provided for both civil
and criminal remedies for MGDPA violations." 7 A civil reme-
dy is available to any person who has been damaged by a
112. MINN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 3 (1994).
113. MINN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 4 (1994).
114. MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 16 (1994). This statute provides as follows:
Responsible authority. "Responsible authority" in a state agency or statewide
system means the state official designated by law or by the commissioner as the
individual responsible for the collection, use and dissemination of any set of
data on individuals, government data, or summary data. "Responsible author-
ity" in any political subdivision means the individual designated by the
governing body of that political subdivision as the individual responsible for
the collection, use, and dissemination of any set of data on individuals,
government data, or summary data, unless otherwise provided by state law.
Id.; see also MINN. R. 1205.0200, subps. 12, 13, 14, 15 (1995) (describing the role and
function of the responsible authority).
115. See Hennepin County Social Servs. Dep't v. Hale, 470 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (providing that the MGDPA vests final authority to determine the
accuracy and completeness of data in the Commissioner of Administration).
116. See MINN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 4 (1994) (outlining the procedure for an
individual data subject when data is inaccurate or incomplete). The Act of Aug. 1,
1995, 1995 Minn. Laws 259 art. 1, § 59 states as follows:
The commissioner of administration in consultation with the commissioner of
human services, county attorneys, legal services, local social service agencies,
community agencies, and interested citizens shall develop a process for
resolving disputes about the accuracy and completeness of data on individuals
at the point where the disputed data is held and for the lowest possible cost.
If the process requires legislation to implement, the commissioner of
administration shall propose such legislation by February 1, 1996.
117. See MINN. STAT. § 13.08 (1994) (describing civil remedies); MINN. STAT. § 13.09
(1994) (describing criminal penalties).
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violation of the MGDPA.18 Suit may be brought against the
governmental entity to recover damages sustained plus costs and
reasonable attorney's fees." 9 If the court determines that
there was a willful violation by the governmental entity, that
entity shall be liable for exemplary damages of "not less than
$100 nor more than $10,000 for each violation." 120  In addi-
tion, an individual may bring an action for equitable relief
12 1
The court is authorized to "make any order or judgment as may
be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of
any practices which violate this chapter."
122
A willful violation of the MGDPA is a misdemeanor under
Minnesota law.'21 A willful violation by any public employee
also constitutes "just cause for suspension without pay or




The need for precision in determining the category and
classification of each piece of information maintained in
government files, coupled with the additional restrictions and
requirements for access to each piece of information that is
classified as not public, has understandably resulted in disputes
about whether an individual has access to a specific piece of
government data. 12  The lack of discretion given agencies in
complying with the MGDPA makes compromise elusive.
Disputes about classification and access take on added signifi-
cance because the MGDPA imposes absolute liability for a
miscalculation in making a determination on either classification
118. MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 1 (1994).
119. See, e.g., Pathmanathan v. St. Cloud State Univ., 461 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (denying attorney's fees because losing party's position "was a plausible,
though incorrect, interpretation of the statute . ..
120. MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 1 (1994).
121. MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 2 (1994).
122. Id.
123. MINN. STAT. § 13.09 (1994).
124. Id.
125. Given the complexity of the statute and the number of governmental entities
governed by the MGDPA, the amount of litigation is surprisingly small. The number
of disputes can be illustrated by the total requests for Commissioner's Opinions since
the authority was granted. Between August and December of 1993, the Commissioner
issued 11 opinions. In 1994, the Commissioner issued 60 opinions. In 1995, the
Commissioner issued 55 written opinions.
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Prior to 1993, if the person requesting access and the
agency holding the information could not agree on the classi-
fication or the requester's right to access, the only remedy
provided by the MGDPA was judicial review and decision. 27
When 1993 Minnesota Laws chapter 192 section 38 was enacted,
it gave the Minnesota Department of Administration the right to
issue "written opinions" about "any question relating to public
access to government data, rights of subjects of data or classifica-
tion of data under this chapter or other Minnesota statutes
governing government data practices"128 if requested by a
governmental entity. This type of opinion is referred to as an
interpretive opinion in this article. The legislation also autho-
rized the Department of Administration to provide a written
opinion to any person who disagrees with a determination
regarding data practices, which is made by a state agency,
statewide system, or political subdivision.1 29  These written
opinions address "the person's right as a subject of government
data or right to have access to government data.""' ° This type
of opinion is referred to as an adjudicative opinion in this
article.
C. Examples of Disputes
The problem of more than one potential classification for
a particular type of information and the lack of agency flexibility
in resolving conflicts is well illustrated by the disputes over access
that have been presented to the Commissioner for opinion. One
recurring question concerns the proper classification of informa-
tion that can be fairly characterized as investigative data,
131
126. See MINN. STAT. §§ 13.08, 13.09 (1994) (applying to civil remedies and criminal
penalties).
127. See MINN. STAT. §§ 13.03, subd. 8 (person seeking access may bring action in
district court); MINN. STAT. § 14.63 (1984) (stating that any person aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review).
128. MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 1995).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 1 (1994). Subdivision 1 provides that "a 'pending
civil legal action' includes but is not limited to judicial, administrative or arbitration
proceedings. Whether a civil legal action is pending shall be determined by the chief
attorney acting for the state agency, political subdivision or statewide system."
Subdivision 2 provides as follows:
data collected by state agencies, political subdivisions, or statewide systems as
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personnel data,1 32 or other data. Opinions 93-003, 95-028 and
94-004 illustrate some of these problems.
Opinion 93-003 framed this issue in the context of some
sexually-explicit videotapes.1 33  The videotapes showed the
head coach of the University of Minnesota's women's intercol-
legiate gymnastics team and her assistant coach husband
engaged in sexual activity.13 4  The videotape segments of this
sexual activity appeared at the end of a videotape showing the
team in competition. 35 There is apparently no specific finding
that the coach's husband intentionally distributed the tapes that
included the segments showing the sexual activity, but somehow
the tapes were distributed to gymnastics team members.
The University terminated the coach before the end of her
contract.13 6 The termination notice included a statement that
the dismissal was based on breaches of her contract and
University policy.137  The notification mentioned the making
and distribution of a videotape showing the coach and her
husband engaged in sexual activity."3  The coach challenged
her termination before a University of Minnesota grievance
panel.1 3 9  The panel recommended no dismissal."4  The
regent who reviewed the panel's decision reversed this decision
and sustained the original determination to terminate.1 41  The
part of an active investigation undertaken for the purpose of the commence-
ment or defense of a pending civil legal action, or which are retained in
anticipation of a pending civil legal action, are classified as protected
nonpublic data pursuant to section 13.02, subdivision 13, in the case of data
not on individuals and confidential pursuant to section 13.02, subdivision 3,
in the case of data on individuals ....
MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 2 (1994).
132. Minnesota Statutes § 13.43, subdivision 1 (Supp. 1995) defines personnel data
as follows:
data on individuals collected because the individual is or was an employee of
or an applicant for employment by, performs services on a voluntary basis for,
or acts as an independent contractor with a state agency, statewide system or
political subdivision or is a member of or an applicant for an advisory board
or commission.
133. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 2 (1993).
134. The facts are derived from the Memorandum and Order of the District Court





139. Id. at 4.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4-6.
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regent's decision constituted the University's final determination.
The regent did not view the videotape himself, although the
termination decision referred to the videotape.
142
The University of Minnesota's paper, The Minnesota Daily,
asked the University for a copy of the videotape. 4 The
University refused.1 " The Minnesota Daily requested an adjudi-
catory opinion of the Commissioner of Administration about its
ability to gain access to the videotape.145 The University of
Minnesota argued to the Commissioner that the videotape could
not be released because it was civil investigative data related to
other pending legal actions' 46 between the University and the
head coach and her husband. 47 Civil investigative data is
classified under the MGDPA as confidential data on individuals
while an investigation is ongoing.'" Civil investigative data can
retain a classification of confidential after a matter is over if the
release would jeopardize other ongoing investigations.
1 49
The Commissioner of Administration determined that the
videotape was personnel data, not civil investigative data, and
cited three reasons for this conclusion. In reaching this
conclusion, the Commissioner did not specifically address the
University's argument that the tape was being retained for
possible use in defending the University in pending civil legal
actions. Minnesota Statutes section 13.39, subdivision 2 classifies
as civil investigative data any data collected or retained by a
government body for defending a lawsuit or other similar
proceeding.150 None of the reasons cited by the Commissioner
indicates why the tape did not fit this classification. The first
reason cited by the Commissioner relates to the issue of data
with two classifications. The Commissioner noted that if the data
142. Id.
143. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 1 (1993).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3.
147. See Deli v. University of Minnesota, 511 N.W.2d 46, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that clear and convincing evidence established just cause for the termination
of Katalin and Gabor Deli).
148. MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 2(a) (1994).
149. MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 3 (1994).
150. See MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 2(a) (1994). The information is classified as
"protected nonpublic data" pursuant to § 13.02, subdivision 13, for information not on
individuals, and classified as confidential pursuant to § 13.02, subdivision 3, for
information regarding data on individuals. MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subds. 3, 13 (1994).
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were categorized as personnel data, the data's classification
would be private.'51 On the other hand, if the data were
categorized as civil investigative data, the classification would be
confidential.5 2  The Commissioner then cited Minnesota
Statutes section 13.03, subdivision 4(b) which provides that if
data on individuals is classified as both private and confidential,
the data is private, and concluded that Minnesota Statutes
section 13.03, subdivision 4(b) dictated the determination that
the information be categorized as personnel data because that
would result in a classification of private. 53 This conclusion
ignores Minnesota Rule 1205.0200, subparts 3 and 9.154 It also
undermines the category of civil investigative data. Were this
reasoning adopted in other cases, no information could maintain
a classification of civil investigative data if it also happens to fall
within another category of data classified as private. This
conclusion runs contrary to the administrative rules and the
directive that statutes be construed in order to give effect to all
of their provisions.1
5
The Commissioner based her second reason for rejecting
the category of civil investigative data for the videotapes on her
theory about the legislative history of Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 13.39, which establishes the category of civil investigative
data. 6 Legislative history is properly invoked to interpret
statutes when the statute is ambiguous." 7 The difficulty in this
case is that two provisions of the same law appear to be in
conflict with each other. Before legislative history is invoked,
Minnesota law directs that in such a case, "the two shall be
151. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 3 (1993).
152. Id.
153. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 3 (1993) (concluding that for the data
to be classified as private, it must also be "personnel data" pursuant to § 13.43).
154. See supra note 82 (defining confidential data).
155. See MINN. STAT. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1994). The use of Minnesota Statutes
§ 13.03, subdivision 4(b) (1994) is also confusing because the personnel data at issue
here would have been public, not private. Minnesota Statutes § 13.03, subdivision 4(b)
(1994) doesn't resolve any conflict between data classified as both confidential and
public.
156. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 3 (1993) (finding that a major reason
for the Legislature's enactment of Minnesota Statutes § 13.39 (1994) was to prevent the
public from having full access to the government's data, which would put the govern-
ment at a continual disadvantage in litigation).
157. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1994); St. Peter Herald v. City of St. Peter, 496 N.W.2d
812, 814 (Minn. 1993) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1990)).
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construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.""'8
In this case, it is possible to give effect to both Minnesota
Statutes section 13.43, personnel data, and Minnesota Statutes
section 13.39, civil investigative data. As noted in Section II-C
above, the MGDPA contains its own provisions concerning a
changing category of government data. Minnesota Stat-
utes section 13.03, subdivision 4(a) directs an agency to change
the classification of data if it is required to do so to comply with
specific statutes applicable to the data in the possession of the
receiving agency.159 In the case of the videotape, the investiga-
tion began in the context of an employee discipline matter16°
Other suits and investigations were later commenced. The
provisions of Minnesota Statute section 13.03, subdivision 4(a)
direct that the data classification change to acknowledge the
evolution of the case. 6 The matter that began as an employ-
ee disciplinary action with data classified under Minnesota
Statutes section 13.43, subdivision 1, evolved into a civil investiga-
tion, so the data would today be classified under Minnesota
Statute section 13.39.162 Resort to legislative history is not
required.
Finally, the Commissioner offers an interesting reading of
the term "collected" as the third basis for determining that the
158. MINN. STAT. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1994).
159. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 4(a) (1994).
160. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 2-3 (1993).
161. M1NN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 2(a) (1994).
162. Id.
163. In addition, the legislative history cited by the Commissioner is referred to
without reference to any contemporaneous statements of legislators or other bases used
to determine legislative history. The Commissioner opined that the only reason the
legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes § 13.39 was to prevent a litigant against the
government from learning the government's case through use of the MGDPA access
requirements. Because the man who prepared the videotapes knew what was in them,
the Commissioner concluded that "there appears to be no practical reason why these
tapes should be considered to be civil investigative data under § 13.39." Op. Comm'r
Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 3 (1993).
This conclusion overlooks the plain language of Minnesota Statutes § 13.39 (1994)
and ignores the provisions of Minnesota Statutes § 13.03, subdivision 4(a) (1994), which
allow for a change in the classification of data "to comply with... a specific statute
applicable to the data in possession of the.., receiving agency." Minnesota Statutes
§ 13.39, subdivision 2(b) (1994) gives a complainant access to any statements provided
by the complainant to the government. This provision would be unnecessary if all
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videotapes were not civil investigative data."6  The Commis-
sioner, in essence, determined that evidence in a case is not
collected unless it is first in the possession of the investigator
after a formal investigation has begun.16
The data's classification dictates who may have access to it.
Personnel data documenting the basis for a disciplinary action
is public. 66  Civil investigative data is confidential during an
active investigation; 16 7 once inactive, the statute provides that
the data become public "unless the release of the data would
jeopardize another pending civil legal action, and except for
those portions of a civil investigative file that are classified as not
public data or by this chapter or other law."1" Clearly the
Legislature anticipated that some data would temporarily change
classifications depending on whether an investigation is ongoing.
Videotapes that would be personnel data before and after an
investigation would be civil investigative data during the investi-
gation under Minnesota Statutes section 13.39.169 The statute
establishing the category of civil investigative data provides the
criteria for determining whether data is part of a pending civil
legal action and thereby changes categories and classifica-
tions.17 The issue before the Commissioner was a common
164. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 3-4 (1993) (finding that the record
showed that Gabor Deli provided the tapes to the members of the Women's Gymnastic
Team).
165. The Commissioner relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in St.
Peter Herald v. City of St. Peter, 496 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1993), which held that a notice
of claim mailed to the City of St. Peter was not "collected" by the City and therefore was
not within the provision of Minnesota Statutes § 13.39, subdivision 2. The court relied
on the plain meaning of "collected" as "to bring together into a band, group,
assortment or mass: Gather." Id. at 814 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 557 (1981)). While receiving an unsolicited letter in the mail may not be
"collecting," gathering evidence for the investigation of the coaches is squarely within
the definition employed by the court in this case.
166. MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 2(a) (1994). The Commissioner determined that
the videotapes documented the basis for the disciplinary action even though the regent
who made the final determination had not seen the videotapes. In one opinion, the
Commissioner was asked to determine whether certain data in a personnel file
documented the basis for disciplinary action. However, the Commissioner declined to
do so. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-051, at 2, 6 (1994).
167. See MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 2 (1994).
168. MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 3 (1994).
169. MINN. STAT. § 13.39 (1994).
170. It is only when the chief attorney for the governmental entity determines that
a civil action is pending that data related to the investigation can be confidential or
protected nonpublic data. The Commissioner did not mention whether the chief
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one involving data that may reasonably fit within several
categories and classifications of data. Unfortunately, the
Commissioner's opinion did little to assist the parties in sorting
out the various provisions.
Commissioner's Opinion 95-028 illustrates internal incon-
sistencies in the way the MGDPA treats comparable data. This
opinion was issued pursuant to a request for an adjudicatory
opinion involving a public employer questioning a public
employee about payroll timesheets.7 1 An auditor collected the
data, which concerned possible improprieties in claims for
overtime pay by an employee of the University of Minnesota.7
Arguably, this data could be personnel data, civil investigative
data, or internal auditing data. 17s  The Commissioner deter-
mined that "[c]learly, the data.. . were collected because she is
an employee of the University" which dictated that the data
collected would be personnel data174 unless the chief attorney
for the University determined there was an investigation.
175
The Commissioner rejected this position, however, and conclud-
ed that because the information had been gathered by an
internal auditor, the data became internal auditing data at the
time of its collection.1 76  The Commissioner rejected the
attorney for the University of Minnesota had determined that a civil action was pending.
In other opinions, the Commissioner has applied Minnesota Statutes § 13.39,
subdivision 3 (1994) and taken the position that information gathered to investigate
alleged wrongdoing by a public employee is classified under Minnesota Statutes § 13.43
(1994) as personnel data unless the chief attorney for the political subdivision has
determined that a civil action is pending. See, e.g., Ops. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-050,
95-048, 95-041, 95-035 (1995).
171. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-028, at 4 (1995).
172. Id. at 6.
173. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43 (1994) (defining personal data); MINN. STAT. § 13.39
(1994) (defining civil investigative data). In addition, Minnesota Statutes § 13.794,
subdivision 1 (1994) defines internal auditing data as follows:
Data, notes, and preliminary drafts of reports created, collected, and
maintained by the internal audit offices of state agencies or persons perform-
ing audits for state agencies and relating to an audit or investigation are
confidential data on individuals or protected nonpublic data until the final
report has been published or the audit or investigation is no longer being
pursued actively.
MINN. STAT. § 13.794, subd. 1 (1994).
174. Op. Comm'r Dep'tAdmin. 95-028, at 6 (1994). Payroll timesheets are classified
by Minnesota Statutes § 13.43, subdivision 2 (1994) as public data.
175. SeeMINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 1 (1994); see also Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-
054, at 5 (1995).
176. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-028, at 7 (1995).
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University's argument that the category and classification of the
data change after being collected, noting that the statute
governing internal auditing data classifies such data as confiden-
tial at the time it is collected. 7 Unlike the statutes governing
civil or, to some extent, criminal investigative data, the internal
audit data statute fails to provide the chief attorney for the
governmental entity conducting the audit the authority to
determine that an investigation has begun before data may be
classified as investigative data.
178
The classification of data in Commissioner's Opinion 95-028
was determined by the occupation of the person asking the
question, not by the type of information solicited.179 This
result makes administration of the MGDPA a trap for the unwary
and seems to usurp agency discretion in assigning duties to
employees.
Another type of case where data appears to fall in more
than one category and does have more than one classification,
is illustrated by Commissioner's Opinion 94-004. This inter-
pretive opinion is issued in response to a request from the Crow
Wing County Auditor. 8 ° The question concerned the classifi-
cation of logs of long distance telephone calls made from the
telephone of a public employee.' The Commissioner noted
that the long distance telephone bills paid with public funds are
specifically classified as public data under Minnesota Statutes
section 10.46.182 The Commissioner also noted that other
statutes could classify some of the information in the logs as not
public.' In those cases, presumably, information that would
reveal the confidential data such as names of reporters of
suspected child abuse or undercover officers acting in their
undercover capacity should be classified as not public in
accordance with their specific classifications and the canons of
construction found in Minnesota Statutes section 13.03, subdivi-
sion 4 and Minnesota Statutes section 645.26. However,
Minnesota Statutes section 10.46 does not recognize these
177. Id. at 10-11.
178. See MINN. STAT. § 13.794 (1994).
179. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-028 (1995).
180. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-004, at 2 (1994).
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 10.46 (1994).
183. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-004, at 3 (1994).
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exemptions specifically. Arguably, the general canons of
construction should dictate that Minnesota Statutes section 10.46
and the specific statutes classifying some of the information in
the telephone logs as not public, should be harmonized,
notwithstanding that it is difficult to balance the Legislature's
intent when Minnesota Statutes section 10.46 contains no
reference to the MGDPA.
18 4
These opinions illustrate some of the problems inherent in
a classification system that often results in more than one
category and classification for every piece of information
collected, created, received, maintained and disseminated by any
governmental entity.
The Legislature granted the Commissioner of Administra-
tion the authority to resolve some of these conflicts without
expensive court action through issuance of written opinions.
The following is an analysis of this legislatively granted authority
and a brief discussion of the way the Commissioner implements
this power.
IV. COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY OPINIONS
The Legislature delegated to the Commissioner of Admin-
istration the authority to issue two types of opinions, interpretive
and adjudicative opinions." Interpretive opinions can be
issued to a governmental entity on any question relating to
public access of governmental data, rights of data subjects, or
classification of data, whereas adjudicative opinions regarding a
person's rights as a subject of data or right to have access to
governmental data may be issued to any person who disagrees
with a determination regarding data practices made by a
governmental entity."6 The Legislature also directed that the
Commissioner's opinions be "given deference by a court in a
proceeding involving the data."187 It is not clear if "a pro-
ceeding involving the data" refers only to a proceeding brought
after the Commissioner has issued an opinion involving an actual
dispute over specific data between parties involved in an
184. See Doe v. Minnesota State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 435 N.W.2d 45, 49
(Minn. 1989) (holding that the MGDPA and the statute governing board of medical
examiners should be read harmoniously).
185. See MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subds. 1, 2 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
186. See id.
187. MiNN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 2 (1994).
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adjudicative type decision, or if the Legislature intended that
deference also be given to the Commissioner's interpretive
opinions, or if the Legislature meant for the opinions to have
precedential effect.
The statute should be interpreted in a way consistent with
the law in Minnesota. The deference given by courts to an
agency decision varies with the type of decision rendered by the
agency. The following sections attempt to answer the question
of the appropriate level of deference by first identifying the types
of decisions rendered by the Commissioner and then identifying
the appropriate types of deference for each. The Minnesota
Constitution provides that "[n] o person or persons belonging to
or constituting one of [the legislative, executive or judicial]
departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging
to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided
in this constitution." l"8 Because of Minnesota's express separa-




Minnesota has defined legislative action as "action which will
affect 'an open class of individuals, interests, or situations. ' ""
The constitutional prohibition against the exercise of legislative
power by any other branch is a prohibition against the delega-
tion of what Minnesota courts have called "purely legislative"
power.'9 The Legislature necessarily delegates some power to
enact rules. The Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the
prohibition against delegation of purely legislative power in Lee
v. Delmont.'92 There, the court held that the constitutional
prohibition applied to the delegation of "the authority to make
a complete law-complete as to the time it shall take effect and
as to whom it shall apply-and to determine the expediency of
188. MINN. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
189. See generally John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1205 (1993).
190. In re Christenson, 417 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Barton
Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. 1978)).
191. Id.
192. 228 Minn. 101, 111-15, 36 N.W.2d 530, 537-39 (1949).
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its enactment."193 In other words, pure legislative power is the
"discretion to determine when and upon whom a law shall take
effect.... 194  Recognizing the growing complexity of govern-
ment, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that:
where it is impractical to lay down a definite comprehensive
rule-such as, where the administration turns upon questions
of qualifications of personal fitness, or where the act relates
to the administration of a police regulation . . .- [and] it is
not essential that a specific prescribed standard be expressly
stated in the legislation. This is so because it is impossible for
the legislature to deal directly with the many details in the
varied and complex conditions on which it legislates, but
must necessarily leave them to the reasonable discretion of
administrative offices. 195
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that a
delegation of authority to the Commissioner of Public Safety to
define the term "habitual violator of the traffic laws" was a
proper delegation of authority. 96 "To prescribe a more specif-
ic standard would only place the Commissioner in a straitacket
and interfere with the fair and efficient administration of his
duties." '97 The United States Supreme Court expressed a
similar sentiment in upholding Federal Sentencing Guidelines
where the Court stated that "our jurisprudence has been driven
by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate
power under broad general directives.""9 '
Separation of powers continues to be required by the
Minnesota Constitution and the Legislature is prohibited from
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 312, 126 N.W.2d 778,
781 (1964) (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 315-16, 126 N.W.2d at 781-82.
197. Id. at 313, 126 N.W.2d at 781.
198. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). See generally Elise
Lambrou, The Exceptions Process: The Administrative Counterpart To A Court of Equity and
The Danger it Presents to the Rulemaking Process, 30 EMORY LJ. 1135 (1981) (detailing
problems with exceptions to the rules made during administrative review); Note,
Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 91 YALE LJ. 739 (1982)
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delegating purely legislative power to an administrative agen-
cy.' 99 Yet, it is appropriate under Minnesota law to delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to effect a law within a
"sufficiently definite declaration of policy and standard [s] ."20"
The Legislature has delegated some limited legislative
powers by granting the Commissioner of Administration the
authority to issue temporary classifications."° On the other
hand, the delegation of authority to issue written opinions is
limited to answering questions about existing procedures, data
subject rights, and classifications of data in Minnesota law. 02
Any exercise of a legislative function in a written opinion, such
as creating a new classification or law of general applicability, is
unauthorized and inconsistent with Minnesota's constitutionally
required separation of powers.
B. Administrative Authority
A precise definition of administrative action is elusive. In a
traditional separation of powers framework, the executive branch
alone would exercise administrative powers. In a somewhat
circular definition of administrative law, Professor Schwartz states
"that branch of the law that controls the administrative opera-
tions of government... sets forth the powers that may be
exercised by administrative agencies."20 3  The difficulty in
defining administrative power is explained in part by Professor
Schwartz's observation that "[t]he possession of legislative and
judicial power is the hallmark of the agency... [and] [i] t is
through its exercise of rulemaking and adjudicatory authority
that the administrative agency is able to determine private rights
and obligations."0 4  However, Professor Schwartz defines
199. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that the powers of the government are
divided into their respective departments and that one department cannot exercise the
power accorded to another).
200. Thomas v. Housing and Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth, 234 Minn. 221, 247-
48, 48 N.W.2d 175, 191 (1951); see also Anderson, 267 Minn. at 314, 126 N.W.2d at 781
(allowing a certain amount of discretion to administrators to make exceptions absent
specific standards set by the Legislature).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 13.06 (1994).
202. See MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1 (1994 & Supp. 1995); see aLso Frost-Benco
Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984) (stating
that "[t]he extent ofjurisdiction or authority bestowed upon an administrative agency
is measured by the statute from which it derives its authority.").
203. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.1 (3rd ed. 1991).
204. Id. at § 1.5.
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administrative action only in terms of the types of power
exercised by the other branches of government.2 5 This sec-
tion will discuss the confines of an agency's rule-making authori-
ty. Further discussion on adjudicatory or judicial functions of
the Commissioner of Administration's opinions will be addressed
in a later section.
Rule-making authority in Minnesota includes the authority
to enact several types of rules, such as legislative, interpretive,
and procedural rules.0 8 In these instances, the Commission-
er's interpretive opinions most resemble interpretive rule-
making.
0 7
These interpretive opinions contain many characteristics of
the interpretive rules of administrative agencies. These opinions
are rendered at the request of a public entity concerning
questions which may not be related to an actual controversy.
Yet, the opinions are related to questions arising under the
MGDPA and other Minnesota statutes "governing government
data practices."208
Interpretive rules have been variously described as rules
"promulgated to make specific the law enforced or administered
by the agency" " or rules issued by an agency to advise on how
the agency intends to exercise discretionary power.2"0  As
discussed earlier, the MGDPA leaves very little discretion in
determining the appropriate category and classification of
government data. This results in very little discretion for the
Commissioner of Administration in issuing interpretive opinions.
Consequently, the opinions are useful only to the extent they
can illuminate how the MGDPA categorizes and classifies data.
In Minnesota, all rules, including interpretive rules, must be
promulgated under the procedures of the Minnesota Administra-
205. Id.
206. See McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 577 (Minn. 1977).
207. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 6.3 (J. Pierce, 3rd ed. 1994)
(Supp. 1994, 1995); see also Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect:
An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 358-59 (finding
that an interpretive rule stated what the agency thought the statute meant).
208. See MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
209. See Minnesota-Dakotas Retail Hardware Ass'n v. State, 279 N.W.2d 360, 364
(Minn. 1979).
210. Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (1993).
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five Procedure Act to be valid.21 The Commissioner's opin-
ions are not promulgated, yet some exceptions to this general
rule exist. Unpromulgated interpretive rules may be upheld, but
only to the extent they reflect the plain meaning of the law
interpreted, or constitute a long-standing interpretation of an
ambiguous rule.21 2  Accordingly, these standards apply to
determine if an interpretive Commissioner's opinion is valid.
Legislation authorizing these opinions provides explicitly that the
opinions are not binding and therefore are not given the force
and effect of law. However, a departure from the plain meaning
of the statute or the adoption of a new interpretation will also
undermine a court's ability to give them any deference.
C. Quasi-Judicial Power
A quasi-judicial act is an act of a public officer, commission
or board that is 'presumably the product or result of investi-
gation, consideration and deliberate human judgment based
upon evidentiary facts of some sort commanding the exercise
of their discretionary power. It is the performance of an
administrative act which depends upon and requires the
existence or non-existence of certain facts which must be
ascertained and the investigation and determination of such
facts cause the administrative act to be termed quasi-judi-
cial.'
211
Minnesota Statutes section 13.072, subdivision 1 grants the
Commissioner of Administration the authority to issue advisory
opinions which are quasi-judicial in nature. These opinions are
issued at the request of a person in a dispute with a governmen-
tal agency over a determination regarding data practices made
by the agency.214 The Commissioner of Administration con-
ducts the hearing with written submissions by, or telephone calls
211. See, e.g., Cable Communication Bd. v. Nor-West Cable, 356 N.W.2d 658, 667
(Minn. 1984) (finding that all rules are subject to the rulemaking requirements of
MAPA).
212. See Mapleton Community Home v. Department of Human Servs., 391 N.W.2d
798, 801 (Minn. 1986); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995) (affirming an
agency's exception absent legislative rule). See generally Saunders, supra note 206
(discussing issues surrounding agency interpretation of ambiguous rules).
213. Neitzel v. County of Redwood, 521 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(quoting Oakman v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 108-09, 203 N.W.2d 514, 517
(1925)).
214. See MiNN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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from, the parties involved in the dispute."1 5 The actual subject
of the data may be a party to this dispute and may or may not
even be notified of the request for access to information about
that person.2 1 6  The procedure used by the Commissioner
limits her ability to judge credibility and find facts which may be
at issue.21 7 The Commissioner acknowledges the shortcomings
of hearings not conducted in accordance with any rules of
evidence or procedure by noting that "[hier opinions are by
their nature conditional on the facts and information presented
to her by the government entity and the data subject."
218
D. Deference to Opinions
As stated earlier, the deference a court will give an agency
decision depends primarily upon the type of decision rendered.
For each type of opinion, the court considers several factors to
determine whether increased or decreased deference should be
given the agency determination.
1. Interpretive Opinions
The interpretation of a statute is reserved for the judiciary
under the Minnesota Constitution.219 Minnesota courts have
consistently recognized the power to interpret law as a judicial
function .220 Accordingly, the courts will not defer to the legal
interpretations by other branches of government. If an agency
215. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-028, at 1-3 (1995) (using correspondence to
provide response by a party to the issues raised); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-004, at
1 (1994) (determining the facts of the dispute from letters submitted by the parties);
Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-003, at 2 (1993) (basing the opinion on information
obtained by a faxed letter).
216. MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
217. See generally Richard McMillan, Jr. & Todd D. Peterson, The Permissible Scope Of
Hearings, Discovery, And Additional Fact-Finding During Judicial Review Of Informal Agency
Action, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333 (discussing the limitations of agency records and the court's
treatment of these records on review).
218. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-007, at 2 (1993).
219. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
220. See, e.g., Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d
639, 642 (Minn. 1984) (stating that the court is not bound by the decision of the MPUC
and need not defer to "agency expertise"); Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minnesota Dep't of
Nat'l Resources, 300 N.W.2d 769, 777 (Minn. 1980) (stating that an agency decision is
reversed only when it reflects an error of law). Some opinions rendered by the
Commissioner acknowledge that issues of legislative interpretation present issues for the
courts to decide. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-001 (1994) (acknowledging that the
definition of "person" is for the courts to decide).
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decision "is based on legal rather than factual considerations, the
reviewing court is not bound by the decision of the agency and
need not defer to agency expertise."221
2. Adjudicative Opinions
In general, a court will adopt an administrative agency's
findings in a contested or quasi-judicial matter unless the
decision "reflects an error of law, is arbitrary and capricious, or
is unsupported by substantial evidence.",
222
a. Deference to Legal Conclusions
In an adjudicatory hearing, reviewing courts do not give
deference to an agency's interpretation of the law. With some
limited exceptions, interpretation of statutes is a judicial
function. A court may give weight to a statutory construction of
an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with implementing
the statute.223 Courts may also give deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation as long as the
interpretation is reasonable. 2 '4 The deference a court will give
an agency's findings in a contested matter depends to a large
extent on the indicia of reliability of the findings.225 The
Commissioner of Administration noted that "to the extent that
a court finds that the Commissioner's opinion rests on incom-
plete or incorrect facts, the court will obviously be free to find
its own facts." 2 6
The limited hearing and process to request an adjudicative
221. North Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Counsel, 262 N.W.2d 312,
320 (Minn. 1977).
222. Cable Communications Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership,
356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. 1984); In reKokesch, 411 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
223. See Cable Communications Bd., 356 N.W.2d at 667 (stating that if an agency
interpretation merely restates existing policy or is consistent with the regulation, it
implies the court has upheld the agency action).
224. See St. Otto's Home v. Department of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn.
1989) (reviewing an agency's determination of common terms and finding the decision
reasonable); Krumm v. R.A. Nadeau Co., 276 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn. 1979) (stating
that when the meaning of a statute is doubtful, courts should give great weight to a
construction placed upon it by the department charged with its administration).
225. See, e.g., St. Otto's Home, 437 N.W.2d at 39-40; Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256
N.W.2d 808, 827 (Minn. 1977) (stating courts will review agency decisions to see if
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence and whether conclusions are arbitrary
or capricious).
226. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 93-007, at 3 (1993).
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determination obviously limit the Commissioner's ability to find
facts accurately. In addition, judicial review requires sufficient
findings to assure that they are supported in the record. 27
b. Deference to Agency Charged with Implementing
Statute or to Agency's Expertise
If a statute's meaning is unclear, courts have appropriately
given great weight to an agency's statutory construction when it
is charged with implementing the statute. 8 It is not clear that
this exception applies to the Commissioner's opinions. The
MGDPA charges each agency and political subdivision it governs
to be responsible for implementing policies and procedures for
access to its data consistent with its rules.229 The MGDPA also
provides for each government entity to compile a list of govern-
ment data maintained in its files, with the appropriate classifica-
tion assigned for each type of data. 2 0 The MGDPA assigns to
agencies and local officials the responsibility of determining
matters such as when a civil action is pending,21 when a
criminal investigation is active,232 the actual costs for copies of
data,233 whether a child's parent can have access to information
about his or her child over the child's objection, 3 4 when
criminal investigative data should be released to the victim of the
crime,235 and when the names of victims and witnesses can be
withheld from the public,3 6 among other things. A Commis-
sioner's opinion concerning employee disciplinary data recogniz-
es that determining which data in a personnel file "constitute [s]
227. See, e.g., In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. C. App. 1992)
(determining that an absence of specific finding by the Commissioner in the record
rendered the decision erroneous).
228. See Krumm, 276 N.W.2d at 644; see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489, 1493
(1995) (declaring that no deference is given if interpretation is inconsistent with plain
meaning of statute and written by staff and not agency itself); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (stating that the degree of deference varies according to
factors such as timing and consistency of the agency's position and the nature of its
expertise).
229. See MINN. STAT. §§ 13.03, subd. 2, 13.05, subd. 8 (1994).
230. See MINN. STAT. § 13.05, subd. 1 (1994).
231. See MINN. STAT. § 13.39, subd. 1 (1994).
232. See MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subd. 5 (1994).
233. See MINN. STAT. §§ 13.03, subd. 3, 13.04, subd. 3 (1994).
234. See MINN. R. 1205.0500, subp. 2 (1995).
235. See MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subd. 6 (1994).
236. See MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subd. 10(b) (1994).
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the reasons for imposing a disciplinary action" is not knowable
by the commissioner.237  Accordingly, the data documenting
the basis for the action "can best be made by those per-
sons... who made the decisions to discipline these employ-
ees."
238
The Commissioner of Administration has some oversight
duties in implementing the MGDPA. The Commissioner is
charged with promulgating rules of general applicability.2 39 In
addition, the Commissioner may require copies of compilations
of data from other governmental bodies,2 ° may approve a new
or different use or dissemination of data "as necessary to carry
out a function assigned by law"24 1 and may issue a temporary
classification of data.242 In these instances, the Commissioner
is relying on the expertise of the governmental entity asking for
a new use, dissemination, or classification of government data,
not on the Department of Administration's own expertise in
categorizing and classifying data. In determining the appropri-
ate weight to be given a statutory construction by the Commis-
sioner of Administration, the Department of Administration's
limited involvement here should be considered. The depart-
ment plays only a small role in categorizing and classifying the
data collected, created, received, maintained, and disseminated
by the hundreds of governmental entities governed by the
MGDPA.
The courts may give deference to agency decisions when the
agency is acting within its area of expertise. Deference to agency
expertise
has its genesis in the historical deference accorded to the
administrative expertise of individual state agencies, which
were created to deal with particular problems falling within
their province and which consequently have experience with
those specialized areas that are not ordinarily duplicated
within the judicial system. Such a policy of deference need
237. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-051, at 6 (1994).
238. See id.
239. See MINN. STAT. § 13.07 (1994).
240. See MINN. STAT. § 13.05, subd. 1 (1994).
241. See MINN. STAT. § 18.05, subd. 4(c) (1994).
242. An application for a new classification of data must be based upon the fact that
other state agencies or political subdivisions treat similar data as either private or
confidential, or because there is a compelling need to protect the public interest or the
health, safety, or well-being of the data subject. See MINN. STAT. § 13.06, subd. 2 (1994).
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not be applied, however, when the area of regulation ... is
specifically within the court's particularized experience and
expertise.243
Deference to an opinion by the Commissioner of Admin-
istration is problematic because the Commissioner's professed
area of expertise is "to offer consistent interpretation of the
statute."244  Statutory interpretation is not only duplicated
within the judicial system, it is the province of the courts.245
A court, in reviewing a question of law, need not defer to an
agency's expertise in an adjudicative matter.2"
Courts have deferred to agency expertise in adoptions,
247
in determining if workers are employees, 248 and in handling
consumer complaints.249 It is doubtful that the Commissioner
of Administration's professed expertise in statutory construction
would be accorded the same type of deference because of the
Minnesota constitutional requirement that courts exercise
judicial authority and because of the court's expertise in
questions of law.
c. Deference to Interpretation of Ambiguous
Regulation
Courts have also shown deference to an agency's interpre-
tation of its own ambiguous regulation, if the agency interpre-
243. Hennepin County Court Employees Group v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
274 N.W.2d 492, 494 (Minn. 1979).
244. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-004, at 3 (1995).
245. International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Plymouth, 513 N.W.2d 831, 833
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding the court not bound by "agency determinations
concerning questions of law such as statutory interpretation.").
246. See, e.g., Minnesota Teamsters Pub. & Law Enforcement Employee's Union v.
County of McLeod, 509 N.W.2d 554,556 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "statutory
construction is a question of law, subject to de novo review.").
247. In re S.T. & N.T., 497 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (according
deference to Commissioner's expertise in matters of adoption while district court retains
an independent interest where child is a ward of the state because of parental termina-
tion).
248. See In re Kokesch, 411 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that
court should affirm Commissioner's decision unless there exists an error of law or the
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the evidence).
249. In re Sentry Ins. Payback Program Filing, 447 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (recognizing "the Commissioner's and the Department's experience [in]
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tation is reasonable.25 ° Very few Commissioner's opinions have
mentioned the Administrative Rules, Minnesota Rules chapter
1205.21 The Administrative Rules apply only to data on
individuals, and in general do not expand the scope of the
MGDPA.252 To the extent a Commissioner's opinion is based
on the Rules and is a reasonable one, a court may give deference
to the opinion.
3. Analysis of Selected Opinions
The number of requests for interpretive advisory opinions
by a governmental entity is relatively small.253
As stated above, the actual authority delegated to the
Commissioner to issue advisory opinions is consistent with the
authority, which may be properly delegated under the Minnesota
Constitution and implemented without formal rulemaking under
MAPA, provided the opinion sought concerns a long-standing
agency interpretation of an ambiguous rule, and the agency
interpretation is a reasonable one, or corresponds with the plain
meaning of the law or rule.254  The Commissioner's opinions
that have been issued in response to requests for interpretive
opinions frequently offer new interpretations of an ambiguous
law or extend beyond the plain meaning of an unambiguous law.
The Commissioner's opinions on trade secret information,
for example, illustrate a new interpretation of an unambiguous
law.255 In the first opinion issued on this topic,5 6 the Coi-
250. See, e.g., In re Q Petroleum, 498 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
251. But cf. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-009, at 2 (1995) (referring to Minnesota
Rule 1205.0400, subpart 2, which describes who has access to private data within a
governmental entity); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-013, at 1 (1995) (referring to
Minnesota Rule 1205.1600, which includes qualifications concerning the right to an
appeal).
252. MINN. R. 1205.0100, subps. 2, 3 (1995).
253. Fewer than 20 of the Commissioner's first 135 opinions may be classified as
interpretive opinions issued to governmental entities. For purposes of this article, a
request for an advisory opinion is a request for an interpretive opinion only if the
opinion is requested by the governmental entity or entity contracting with the
governmental entity. Requests for opinions by government employees concerning
disputes between them and their public employers over data privacy practices are not
included in this category.
254. See supra section IV.B.
255. Minnesota Statutes § 13.37, subdivision 1(b) defines trade secret information
as follows:
government data, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process (1) that was supplied by the affected individual
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missioner determined that the statute should be interpreted
narrowly, and based her opinion on that narrow interpreta-
tion." 7 The Commissioner first noted that the definition of
trade secret information in the MGDPA is "drawn from the
definition of trade secret" in Minnesota Statutes section 325C.01,
subdivision 5, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.258  Instead of
looking to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and Minnesota cases
interpreting it, the Commissioner turned to a 1990 decision from
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit that interpret-
ed the Federal Freedom of Information Act exemption for trade
secrets. 259 This determination exceeded the Commissioner's
express authority to issue opinions under chapter 13 or other
Minnesota statutes governing government data practices and
does not account for the very different structures and classifica-
tion schemes of applicable Minnesota and federal laws.2 ° The
MGDPA classifies each piece of information based on why it was
gathered and who can see it, whereas the federal Freedom of
Information Act sets up a standard of open access to all govern-
or organization, (2) that is the subject of efforts by the individual or
organization that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy, and (8) that derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use.
See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-037 (1994) (limiting the scope of the term
.government data" as applied to trade secret information); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin.
94-045 (1994) (allowing access to a government contractor's profit and loss statements
despite a contract clause purporting to keep the information confidential); Op. Comm'r
Dep't Admin. 94-047 (1994) (allowing access to government contract despite confiden-
tiality clause provided the information does not constitute trade secret information
under Minnesota Statutes § 13.37, subdivision 1 (b) (1994)); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin.
95-017 (1995) (finding that government contractor's economic forecasts and general
production description had no independent economic value for the purpose of
Minnesota Statute § 13.37, subdivisions 1(b) and 3 (1994); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin.
95-040 (1995) (finding that classification of data is not dependent on the method by
which the government entity attains the data); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-018 (1995)
(ruling that the information to be protected must be generated from a non-government
entity); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-019 (1995) (noting that the Commissioner must
have the information sought to determine its status).
256. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-037 (1994).
257. Id. at 2-4.
258. Id. at 2.
259. Id.
260. MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1(a) (1994). Under the federal Freedom of
Information Act, the exemptions to the Act are broadly worded. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (4) (1988) (defining as protected, "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.").
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ment records unless the record falls within one of the specified
exemptions.26 ' The exemptions are broadly drawn. Federal
law dictates that the exemptions be narrowly construed to
further the policy of openness expressed in the FOIA.
262
Although the MGDPA also provides that government data is
public unless otherwise classified, the Act attempts to classify all
government data and unlike the federal FOIA leaves no discre-
tion to interpret the classifications. Imposing a narrow con-
struction on the definition of trade secret exceeded the authority
of the Commissioner of Administration to issue interpretive
opinions of Minnesota law.263 In addition, the interpretation
was neither consistent with the plain language of the statute, nor
the long-standing interpretation of an ambiguous law by the
Department of Administration. This construction in essence
ignored the word "including" in the definition of trade secret.
Continuing with her opinion, the Commissioner does cite
applicable Minnesota law to define the requirement that a
person must make reasonable efforts to keep the information
secret to claim trade secret protection.264 The Commissioner
speculated that a person could obtain some of the information
included in the capital expenditure reports, apparently without
any basis in the record before the Commissioner.2' That
some of the information could be readily obtained is an example
of a factual finding for which there is no basis in the record,
entitling it to no deference.
In Opinion 95-017, the Commissioner of Administration
again determined that certain financial data submitted to the
City of Moorhead was not trade secret information because of
the Commissioner's speculation that information about "recy-
cling trends, an analysis of demand for molded pulp egg cartons,
competitive assessment, process equipment availability, freight
cost competitiveness, and marketing strategy" is readily ascertain-
able through proper means by people who are interested.266
These opinions appear to exceed the Commissioner's authority
to interpret the MGDPA for purposes of issuing advisory
261. See generally MINN. STAT. § 13 (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
262. See generaly FRANKLIN & BOucHARD, supra note 20, at 12-14.
263. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
264. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-037, at 4 (1994).
265. Id.
266. Op. Comm'r Dep'tAdmin. 95-017, at 5 (1995).
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opinions. Opinions interpreting the trade secret provision go
beyond the plain meaning of a law that is not facially ambiguous.
In addition, the Commissioner is in essence finding facts in a
situation where only an interpretive opinion was requested. 67
Other Commissioner's opinions also illustrate interpretations
of the MGDPA that extend beyond the plain meaning of the
statute. In Opinion 95-004, the Commissioner of Administration
was asked to issue an opinion on the proper classification of
booking photographs, sometimes known as mugshots.21 The
Commissioner of Administration had issued an earlier opinion
about mugshots that arose out of a controversy between a
newspaper and a county sheriff's office.269 The Commission-
er's earlier opinion was that booking photos were not classified
under Minnesota Statutes section 13.82 (law enforcement data)
and therefore were public data because they were not classi-
fied.2 10 The Dakota County Attorney pointed out that booking
photos were gathered at the time an inmate is booked at the jail,
and are used for identification purposes, thereby fitting within
the definition of corrections and detention data found in
Minnesota Statutes section 13.85,271 not law enforcement data,
Minnesota Statutes section 13.82. The Commissioner of
Administration rejected this classification based on the Commis-
sioner's characterization of the intent of the Legislature in
authorizing the advisory opinions. The Commissioner stated
the legislative intent was to "assure consistency of application of
Chapter 13 through the employment of the expertise of the
Department of Administration to offer consistent interpretation
267. One problem is that the MGDPA does not address proprietary financial
information submitted to a governmental entity. If one reads the definition of trade
secret to give effect to all of its provisions, the definition will cover some financial infor-
mation, but this interpretation is not comprehensive. The 1996 Minnesota Legislature
classified Two Harbors Development Authority data in Act of April 11, 1996, ch. 440,
1996 Minn. Laws 874, §§ 14, 15, to be effective August 1, 1996.
268. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-004, at 5 (1995).
269. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-020 (1994).
270. Id. at 2.
271. Minnesota Statutes § 13.85, subdivision 1 (1994) states as follows:
Definition. As used in this section, "corrections and detention data" means
data on individuals created, collected, used or maintained because of their
lawful confinement or detainment in state reformatories, prisons and
correctional facilities, municipal or county jails, lockups, work houses, work
farms and all other correctional and detention facilities.
272. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-004, at 2 (1995).
273. Id. at 3.
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of the statute." 74 The Commissioner concluded that if some
governmental entities were to rely on the statutory classification
while others relied on the earlier Commissioner's opinion, there
would be no consistency in the interpretation of booking photos;
therefore mugshots are properly classified as public. 7 In this
opinion, the Commissioner of Administration appears to be
engaged in legislative-type rulemaking by establishing a new law
of general applicability, without following the procedures for
formal rulemaking. 76 The opinion also fails as an interpretive
rule because it does not correspond with the plain meaning of
the statute and is not a long-standing agency interpretation.
4. Opinions on Charges for Copies
The Commissioner also has issued a number of opinions
concerning the rates charged for inspection and copies of
government data.277 Governmental entities are authorized to
charge fees for copies of government data. One section in the
MGDPA authorizes a responsible authority to charge for the
"actual costs of searching for and retrieving government data,
including the cost of employee time, and for making, certifying,
compiling, and electronically transmitting the copies of the data
or the data."278 Another section of the MGDPA authorizes the
responsible authority to "require the requesting person to pay
the actual costs of making, certifying, and compiling the copies"
of private or public data about the requester. 7' The adminis-
trative rules also have provisions for determining the fee for copies.'8
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. The Minnesota Legislature added a specific classification for booking photos
in the Act ofJune 1, 1995. 1995 Minn. Laws 259. Booking photos are now classified
as public data under the statute. Id. at § 23, subd. 17(b). However, a law enforcement
agency may withhold booking photographs if the agency determines that access will
adversely affect an active investigation. Id.
277. SeeOp. Comm'r Dep'tAdmin. 95-011, at2-4 (1995); Op. Comm'rDep'tAdmin.
95-024, at 4-6 (1995), Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-043, at 2-4 (1995); Op. Comm'r
Dep't Admin. 95-044, at 2-5 (1995); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-051, at 7-8 (1995);
Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-028, at 5-7 (1994); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-040, at
6-7 (1994); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-059, at 2-3 (1994).
278. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 3 (1994).
279. See MINN. STAT. § 13.04, subd. 3 (1994).
280. MINN. R. 1205.0300 (1995); MINN. R. 1205.0400 (1995). The fee for copies of
public data on individuals is determined by Minnesota Rule 1205.0300 (1995), and
provides as follows:
Subp. 4. Determining fee for copies. The responsible authority may charge
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The Commissioner issued an early adjudicative opinion
about many disputes between a Mr. Valentino and the Ramsey
County Sheriff concerning Mr. Valentino's access to data in the
sheriff's office. 81 The dispute included a question about
whether the cost assessed by the Ramsey County Sheriff's Office
for copies of its files was excessive.282 In responding to this
issue, the Commissioner noted a difference between the two
statutory sections authorizing recovery of costs for copies.8 3
Despite the government's representation that the charges were
the standard fee and "fairly compensate the County for all the
activities authorized by statute,"" the Commissioner conclud-
ed that the charges were excessive.285 The conclusion was
based on the Commissioner's own experience that "the time
necessary to prepare this file for copying would mean removing
any staples or clips and carrying it to a copying machine."28
The Commissioner did not consider Minnesota Rule 1205.0300,
which allows an agency to be guided by the schedule of standard
copying charges, but cited nothing other than what was appar-
ently the Commissioner's personal experience in making copies
a reasonable fee for providing copies of public data.
In determining the amount of the reasonable fee, the responsible authority
shall be guided by the following-
A. the cost of materials, including paper, used to provide the copies;
B. the cost of the labor required to prepare the copies;
C. any schedule of standard copying charges as established by the agency in
its normal course of operations;
D. any special costs necessary to produce such copies from machine based
record keeping systems, including but not limited to computers and microfilm
systems; and
E. mailing costs.
Id. The fee for copies of private data is determined by Minnesota Rule 1205.0400
(1995) and provides as follows:
Subp. 5. Fees. The responsible authority shall not charge the data subject any
fee in those instances where the data subject only desires to view private data.
The responsible authority may charge the data subject a reasonable fee for
Froviding copies of private data.
ndetermining the amount of the reasonable fee, the responsible authority
shall be guided by the criteria set out in part 1205.0300 concerning access to
public data.
281. SeeOp. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-028, at 1 (1994).
282. Id. at 3.
283. Id. at 6.
284. Id. at 3.
285. Id. at 10.
286. Id. at 7.
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to reach this conclusion.2 87 There is no requirement that the
adjudicatory hearings by the Commissioner be conducted under
formal rules of evidence, but a decision based on factors totally
outside the record removes any basis for deferring to the
findings of the opinion.2 s
In Opinion 94-040, the Commissioner also addressed
disputed copy fees. Here, the Commissioner determined that
"actual costs of making, certifying and compiling the copies" did
not include costs of maintaining and repairing a copy machine
or paying an employee's time.289 This conclusion follows from
the Commissioner's statement that these costs "seem[] to go
beyond what the legislature had in mind when it authorized the
City to recover the actual costs of making, certifying and
compiling the copies. Although the decision of the Com-
missioner restates the statutory requirement that the requester
pay only the actual costs, the discussion indicates that the
Commissioner believes the term "actual cost" may be subject to
limitations not in the statute.291
In Opinion 94-059, the Commissioner applied a statutory
interpretation of the term "actual costs."292 The City of
Rosemount was involved in a dispute over access to data,
including copying charges.29 " The City included costs for copy
machines and maintenance as part of the actual cost of supply-
ing data.294  The Commissioner interpreted the statute as
excluding costs of copy machines and maintenance "unless the
machine and maintenance costs are directly attributable to the
costs of providing the public with copies of public data."
295
This interpretation seems consistent with the plain meaning of
the statute, but the Commissioner presumed that "Rosemount
must operate and maintain copy machines for its internal
287. This is generally not the type of expertise that requires special training,
education and, therefore, deference. Nor does it appear to be the type of fact of which
a court may take judicial notice. Cf MINN. R. EVID. 201.
288. Cf. Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. Petersen, 347 N.W.2d 238, 240 (1984).
289. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-040, at 7 (1994).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-059, at 3 (1994).
293. Id. at 1.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 3.
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operations."29 6 Based on this determination, the Commissioner
found that the City had not shown its costs were the actual costs.
This presumption by the Commissioner is again outside the
record and undermines any factual determination.
In Opinion 95-024, the Commissioner issued an adjudicatory
opinion in which the Commissioner determined that a resolution
of the Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Association was in
violation of the MGDPA because it established the same fee for
copies of both public and private data.29 7  Distinguishing
between the fees authorized by Minnesota Statutes section 13.03
and those authorized by Minnesota Statutes section 13.04
requires the Commissioner to read "actual costs" in two different
ways. 98 This runs counter to the promulgated rules that
establish one set of criteria for determining costs under the
MGDPA and imposes an ambiguity where none exists.
5. Limiting Judicial Deference to Commissioner's Opin-
ions
These opinions299 illustrate several reasons to limit the
deference a court should give the Commissioner's opinions.
These opinions are based on statutory interpretation, a province
reserved for the judiciary. The Commissioner's interpretations
of terms, which might be considered ambiguous, are inconsistent
with long-standing agency regulations. Factual determinations
are made without any basis in the record before the Commission-
er. Finally, the Commissioner is issuing opinions in areas of law
beyond the scope of the authority granted under Minnesota
296. Id.
297. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-024, at 5 (1995).
298. Id.
299. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-011 (1995) (maintaining that the city could
not charge fees not mentioned in the statute); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-024
(1995) (using different criteria to determine actual costs contrary to the MGDPA); Op.
Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-043 (1995) (concluding, absent proof, that the Office of
Administrative Hearings had retained the original document); Op. Comm'r Dep't
Admin. 95-044 (1995) (distinguishing certain fees not to be based solely on actual
costs); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-051 (1995) (finding a .25 charge to be reasonable
on its face, but unreasonable in this instance); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-028
(1994) (basing reasonableness of fees on the Commissioner's personal experience); Op.
Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-040 (1994) (finding limitations on fees not specified in the
statute); Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-059 (1994) (assuming outside the record that
the city maintained copy machines for internal use).
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Statutes section 13.072."o Where the Commissioner's opinions
are inconsistent with the MGDPA and her authority to issue
written opinions, these opinions create confusion instead of
solving disputes.
The Commissioner's authority is limited to opinions
regarding a person's rights as a subject of data or the right to
have access to government data.301 Yet a reading of the Com-
missioner's opinions shows that the Commissioner interprets this
delegation of power to include: violations of the MGDPA,
0 2
the offensiveness of photographs maintained by law enforcement
agencies,"0 ' the destruction of data collected without a
Tennessen Warning,"' and the extent of the attorney-client
privilege.0 5 The Commissioner also offers interpretation of
the requirements of the Vulnerable Adult Act, 8 the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, 0 7 and the Minneapolis Civilian Police
Review Authority Rules.308 The Commissioner has issued many
opinions determining that the rates charged by governmental
agencies for copies of government data are unreasonable.
3 0 9
Other states have also instituted administrative proceedings
to resolve disputes over access to government data. Some
examples will be discussed in the next section.
V. DIsPuTEs OVER ACCESS TO DATA IN OTHER STATES
Almost all states provide for administrative appeal10 and
300. MINN. STAT. § 13.072 (1994) (stating that Commissioner's opinions are limited
to public access to data, rights of subjects of data, and classifications of data).
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-029, at 4-5 (1995) (concluding that
commissioners must consider MGDPA violations in their opinions).
303. See, e.g., Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-030, at 4 (1994) (finding the offensive
nature of the photographs appropriate for the commissioners to consider).
304. See Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-028, at 78 (1995) (determining the abuse of
a Tennessen warning).
305. See, e.g., Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-048, at 5 (1995) (considering whether
client billing was protected under the attorney-client privilege).
306. Compare MINN. STAT. § 626.557 (1994) (providing protection for adults with a
mental or physical disability) with Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 95-038, at 2-3 (1995)
(considering a violation within the definition of the statute).
307. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1994) (protecting trade secrets) with Op.
Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-037, at 4 (1994) (construing the act).
308. Op. Comm'r Dep't Admin. 94-025 (1994).
309. See supra notes 276-97 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 5.
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civil judicial review311 of agency determinations on the release
of governmental records. Many other states require review of
agency decisions by the state's attorney general.1 2 Minnesota,
like most states, 33 does not require exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies before an action may be filed in a court. 14
311. ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.124 (1995); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 39-121.02 (1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-107 (Michie 1987); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 6258 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(5) (West 1990); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-211 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 29, § 10005 (1991); D.C.
CODEANN. § 1-1527 (1992); FLA. STAT.ANN. § 119.07 (West 1995);GA. CODEANN. § 50-
18-73(a) (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-15 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 9-343 (1995); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 140/11 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-9 (West
1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 22.5, .8 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-222 (1994); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.882 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:35
(West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409.1 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T
§ 10-619 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66 § 10 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.240 (1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-13 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.027
(Vernon 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.03 (1995); NEv. REV. STAT. § 239.011 (1994);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A.7 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-4 (West 1989); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-12 (Michie 1995); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.4 (McKinney 1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 149.43 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51 § 24A.17.B (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 192.490 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.4 (1995); RLI. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-9 (1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-100 (Law. Co-Op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-505 (1992);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.321 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-401 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 319 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 42.17.330, .340 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-5 (1993); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 19.37 (West 1986); WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203 (1995). Two states allow judicial
remedy of only misdemeanor prosecution. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-109 (1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-27-1 (1995).
312. See ARKL CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(c) (3) (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 10005(e) (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.880 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994) (1994);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501 (1994);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 228.150 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-12 (Michie 1995); OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.450 (1991); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.301 (West 1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.17.325 (West 1996). The attorney general is authorized to bring suit
on behalf of private parties seeking access to government data in Nebraska and
Wisconsin. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.03 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.37 (West
1986). Missouri allows any person to seek a formal opinion from the attorney general.
See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.027.5 (Vernon 1996).
313. But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (c) (1988) (stating that persons making certain
requests to agencies for records "shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative
remedies . .. ."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 319 (1995) (stating that only after denial of
request for public record under Chapter 5 may a person apply for relief in superior
court); Reubens v. Murray, 194 A.D.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (stating that in New
York, parties must exhaust administrative remedies).
314. See MINN. STAT. § 13.08 (1994).
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A. Administrative Hearings
Connecticut,3 ' New York,316 and Utah1 7 have estab-
lished procedures for administrative review of agency decisions
by an agency other than the agency that has the records, in
addition to possible review of decisions through court ac-
tions.318 The Uniform Information Practices Code also
addresses this issue."1 9 The administrative review bodies estab-
lished in Connecticut, New York, and Utah and in the Uniform
Code provide an interesting comparison to Minnesota's scheme.
These administrative review bodies allow for centralized decision-
making, which should enhance consistency3 20 and incorporate
procedural safeguards enhancing reliability of factual conclu-
sions. The decisions of at least one such administrative body are
made available in the form of printed reports.3 2' Summaries
of these procedures follow.
1. Connecticut
The Connecticut Legislature established a Freedom of
Information Commission 22 (Commission) to hear appeals
from agency decisions denying the right to inspect or copy
government data, as well as disputes about administration of the
public meeting law and the state's privacy act.3 23 The Commis-
sion is composed of five members, appointed by the governor
"with the advice and consent of either House or the general
assembly." 24  Commissioners serve four-year, staggered
terms.3 25 No more than three members can be from the same
political party. Three members constitute a quorum.
3 26
The Commission adopted regulations under the Connecticut
315. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
316. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.1 (McKinney 1988).
317. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-401 (1993).
318. See supra note 5; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-15.5 (1996).
319. UNIF. INFORMATION PRACTICES CODE, 13 U.LA 277 (1986).
320. See Dale F. Rubin, State Government Records and Individual Privacy: Theoretical and
Comparative Approaches, 26 URB. LAW. 589, 599-600 (1994).
321. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j(h) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Many states'
attorney general opinions on freedom of information laws are, in fact, published.
322. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
323. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21i(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
324. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
325. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
326. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j(f) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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Administrative Procedure Act which established procedures for
appeals from agency decisions.3 " The Commission has the
authority to conduct contested case hearings and issue advisory
opinions. 28  The contested case hearings may be held before
a hearing officer who hears testimony under oath and has the
power to issue subpoenas if approved by the Commission. 29
The statute and regulations include many procedural safeguards
and opportunities for the parties to explain their positions."'
The regulations also set forth in detail the procedures the
Commission should employ to protect the confidential nature of
disputed records."' 1
The Commission was charged with making findings based
on the record before it and may only take administrative notice
of "judicially cognizable facts."33 2  Proceedings before the
Commission contain many of the due process safeguards of a
judicial proceeding. Although Connecticut courts defer to the
fact-finding of the Commission,33 they do not defer to the
Commission on questions of law.334
2. New York
New York has a Committee on Open Government (Com-
mittee),"' which issues advisory opinions on issues related to
the state's Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Open Meetings
Law, and Personal Privacy Protection Law. 36 The Committee's
staff issues "informal" opinions to any member of the public, and
327. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 1-21j-11 (1996); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-183
(1988 & Supp. 1995) (describing procedures for appeals from agency decisions as
described in Uniform Administrative Procedure Act and as incorporated by Connecticut
Agencies Regulations section 1-21j-11 (1996)).
328. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 1-21j-33, 1-21j-43 (1996).
331. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 1-21j-35(f)(1)-(15) (1996).
332. CONN. AGENCIES REgs. § 1-21j-35(d) (1996).
333. See, e.g., Board of Educ. for City of New Haven v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 545
A.2d 1064 (1988) (holding that where Freedom of Information Commission is fact
finder, supreme court will decline to appraise and weigh evidence considered by
Commission in reaching its determination on challenged findings).
334. Gifford v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 631 A.2d 252, 258 (1993) (holding that
whether the Legislature intended to effectuate a specific purpose is a question of law
for the court to decide).
335. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 89.1(a) (1988).
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formal written opinions if requested by a Committee mem-
ber."3 7 Eleven members serve on the Committee, which func-
tions within the New York Department of State."s The Com-
mittee has no authority to issue binding opinions. Moreover, in
its report to the Governor, the Committee states that the advisory
opinions are "intended to be educational and persuasive, and it
is our hope that they serve to resolve issues and avoid the need
to litigate."'3 9 The Committee is not given specific authority
to resolve disputes. The FOIL is silent as to whether courts
should defer to the committee's factual findings or legal
conclusions. The Committee is notified of any appeal of a
denial of access to records and is informed of all determinations
of those agency appeals.3 °
The Committee appears to function as an intervener in
disputes between agencies and people requesting access to
government information. Significantly, under New York law, a
party must exhaust administrative remedies, 41 including the
administrative appeal within the agency, before he or she may
bring an action in court. Any judicial review of an agency
decision under the FOIL is done in accordance with Article 78,
Civil Practice Law and Rules, which is an action resembling a




Utah recently passed a new Government Records Access and
Management Act.343 The Legislature established a Records
Committee34 to hear appeals from determinations about
access to government data.' In addition, a party may appeal
an agency determination concerning access to information to the
337. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.1(b) (1988).
338. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 89.1(a) (1988).
339. State of N.Y., Department of State, Committee on Open Government, 1995
Report to the Governor and the Legislature from the Committee on Open Government,
Dec. 1995, at 6.
340. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.4(a)(1988).
341. Rubens v. Murray, 194 A.D.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
342. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 89.5 (1988).
343. ChristianJ. Rawley, RecentDeveopments in UtahLaw, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 189,375
(1992).
344. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-501(1)(1995).
345. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-502(1) (c) (1995).
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Chief Administrative Officer of the governmental entity.3 46
Records Committee determinations may also be appealed to
District Court.347 The Records Committee holds a hearing in
which parties may testify, present evidence, and comment on
issues .3' The Committee reviews the agency decision de novo
and may conduct an in-camera review of the disputed govern-
ment information. 49 No discovery is allowed, but the Commit-
tee may issue subpoenas if further evidence is necessary. 50 In
a judicial appeal, the court is also directed to conduct a de novo
review of the record, but may allow evidence to be presented to
the Records Committee if the dispute was heard there. 5 '
Again, in-camera inspection of records is allowed. 52 In mak-
ing their determinations concerning the release of records, the
Legislature directs the courts to weigh the private and public
interests at stake.53
4. Uniform Information Practices Code
The Uniform Information Practices Code contains an
optional article establishing the Office of Information Practic-
es.3 54  The Office of Information Practices is authorized to
issue advisory guidelines, opinions, or other information
concerning a person's rights and the functions and responsi-
bilities of agencies. It may even conduct inquiries regarding
compliance by an agency and recommend disciplinary action to
appropriate officers of an agency. 55 The Office of Informa-
tion Practices is also authorized to bring an action against
another agency to enforce the provisions of the code.356 Such
an enforcement action is limited to declaratory, injunctive or
similar relief
35 7
346. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-401(1)(a) (1995).
347. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-404(1)(a) (1995).
348. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-403(2) (d) (1995).
349. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-403(9) (a)-(10) (b) (1995).
350. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-403(10) (a) (1995).
351. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-403(10)(b) (1995).
352. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-404(6) (1995).
353. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-403(11)(b) (1995).
354. UNIF. INFORMATION PRACTICES CODE, § 4, 13 U.LA 315 (1986).
355. Id. at § 4-102.
356. l.
357. Id at § 2-104.
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5. Comparison to Minnesota's Commissioner's Opinions
The models for dispute resolution in Connecticut, New
York, Utah, and in the Uniform Act illustrate administrative
hearing procedures that range from a formal hearing to
informal, "educational" advisory opinions."5 8 All allow judicial
review of agency action.
Consistent with general principles of administrative law,
under these statutes courts may defer to the factual findings of
an agency if the hearing conducted by the agency has indicia of
procedural safeguards, such as an opportunity for the parties to
present their testimony under oath and be subject to cross-
examination."' The advisory opinions authorized by the
MGDPA, as implemented by the Minnesota Department of
Administration, allow the parties limited process.36° No testi-
mony is taken, documents including those in dispute may not be
submitted for examination, and there is no requirement that the
legal determination be rendered by a person learned in the law.
Despite these limitations in the process, Minnesota's statute
authorizing advisory opinions by the Commissioner directs courts
to give deference to the determinations.361
The principles that guide a court in determining the level
of deference to give an administrative decision in other areas of
law should also apply in evaluating the level of deference that
the Commissioner's opinions should be given. The level of a
court's deference to an agency's findings of fact depends on the
type of record made before the agency, and whether the findings
are supported in the record.362 Deference to an agency's
expertise is appropriate in areas where courts do not have the
needed expertise. Deference to a legal interpretation is
appropriate when the agency's interpretation conforms with the
plain meaning of the statute or represents a long-standing
interpretation of an ambiguous agency rule. Minnesota's
Commissioner's advisory opinions, unlike the decisions rendered
by the commissions in Connecticut and Utah, do not contain a
fact-finding process that supports deference to the facts.
358. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-401 (1995); N. Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.4 (1988).
359. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-401 (1995).
360. See MINN. STAT. § 13.072 (1994).
361. See id.
362. See supra notes 186-245 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, Minnesota's Commissioner's opinions, in most cases,
do not warrant deference to the legal conclusions contained in
them, because they are not rendered by a court or even by the
attorney general or other person with legal training and
experience. 6  The Commissioner's legal conclusions are
entitled to deference insofar as they do not stray from the plain
meaning of the law, or possibly to the extent they represent the
Department of Administration's long-standing interpretation of
the administrative rules governing the MGDPA.3 '
Administrative proceedings in jurisdictions where classifi-
cations of data and restrictions on access are less rigid than those
in Minnesota can be very helpful. Where exceptions to a
presumption of open access are worded broadly, an agency
determination of fact concerning, for example, when the release
of information would cause "undue embarrassment" has
merit."' The usefulness of administrative fact-finding in
disputes under the MGDPA is less apparent.
B. Judicial Review
Because under the MGDPA questions about access to
government data will turn on questions of law in almost all cases,
a remedy allowing prompt judicial review of a government
agency's determination about a request for access to government
data is in many ways a more appropriate remedy than an
administrative fact-finding hearing. The MGDPA contains
remedies of judicial review of agency denial of access, 66 injunc-
tion and an "action to compel compliance" that "should be
heard as soon as possible."6 7 Although not specifically desig-
nated as such, this action closely resembles an action for a writ
of mandamus, and can reasonably be analyzed as a writ of
mandamus.3" The petition for writ of mandamus is not a
363. See, e.g., Independent Sch. Dist. No. 581, Edgerton v. Mattheis, 275 Minn. 383,
386, 147 N.W.2d 374, 377 (1966).
364. Id.
365. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 87.2(b) (1988).
366. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 8 (1994).
367. See MINN. STAT. § 13.08 (1994).
368. See Hunt v. Hoffman, 125 Minn. 249, 253-54, 146 N.W. 733, 734 (1914). The
Minnesota Supreme Court in Hunt was asked to exercise original jurisdiction
concerning a dispute about the counting of ballots by a canvassing board. Id. The
court noted that it had original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and concluded
that "[t]he proceeding authorized by the statute quoted is not designated mandamus,
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perfect fit with the action to compel compliance. These
differences will be discussed below.
To obtain a writ of mandamus in Minnesota a petitioner
must ordinarily show (1) the failure of an official duty clearly
imposed by law, (2) a public wrong specifically injurious to the
petitioner, and (3) no other adequate specific legal remedy."' 9
In the MGDPA, the Legislature has specified that an action to
compel compliance is available without a specific finding that the
petitioner has no adequate remedy at law and thus satisfied the
threshold requirement that petitioners have no adequate legal
remedy by legislative declaration.7 0 The Legislature has, in
essence, declared that the right to access to government data is
such that any legal remedy is per se inadequate.3 7 1 The Legis-
lature's direction that actions to compel compliance be heard as
soon as possible also helps establish the equitable nature of the
remedy.
3 72
Nineteen other states have provided for review of disputes
over access to government data "at the earliest practicable date,"
"without delay," or with a similar directive that the hearings be
expedited. 73 Twelve states even specified times for scheduling
nor by any other name. But we are not particular about names." Id.
369. See Coyle v. City of Delano, 526 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
370. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 6 (1994).
371. The California Legislature also provided that there is no adequate legal remedy
when a party was denied access to government data by eliminating the right to a legal
remedy. See Powers v. City of Richmond, 893 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1995).
372. MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 4 (1994).
373. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6258 (West 1995) (stating that proceedings shall be set
with the object of securing a decision at the earliest possible time); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-72-204(5) (West 1990) (public records) (requiring that a hearing be held at
the earliest practical time), § 24-72-305(7) (West 1990) (criminal justice records)
(requiring that a hearing be held at the earliest practical time); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.-
11 (1) (West 1996) (stating that courts "shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case
priority over other pending cases."); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92F-15(f) (Michie 1995)
(stating that "[e]xcept as to circuit cases the court considers of greater importance,
proceedings before the court... take precedence on the docket over all cases and shall
be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument at the earliest practicable date and
expedited in every way."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 140/11(h) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(providing that except as to matters the court regards as more important, proceedings
under this section will take precedence on the docket and will be assigned for hearing
and trial at earliest practical date and will be expedited); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-222(e)
(1993) (providing that unless the law provides otherwise, this section's proceedings will
be assigned for hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.882(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (stating that "except as otherwise provided by
law or rule of court, proceedings arising under this section take precedence on the
docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for hearing and trial at the earliest
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petitions, responses, hearings, or decisions. 7 4 Ordinarily, such
practicable date."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:35.C. (West 1982) (providing that a suit
to enforce provisions under this section will be tried preferentially and summarily with
any subsequent appeals being placed on the court's preferential docket and heard
without delay to render a decision as soon as practicable); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1
§ 409.1. (West 1989) (declaring that appeals may be taken within five days to superior
court and will be "privileged in respect to their assignment for trial over all other
actions except for writs of habeas corpus and actions brought by the State against
individuals."); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-623(c) (1995) (providing that except
where the court determines cases to be of greater importance, this section's proceedings
and those on appeal will take precedence on the docket, will be heard at the earliest
practicable date, and will be expedited in every manner); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 15.240(3) (West 1994) (stating that "[a]n action commenced pursuant to this section
and appeals therefrom shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument at the
earliest practicable date and expedited in every way."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-13(3)
(1991) (declaring that "[p]roceedings arising under this section shall take precedence
on the docket over all other matters and shall be assigned for hearing and trial at the
earliest practicable date and expedited in every way."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.03
(1995) (stating that "[p] roceedings arising under this section, except as to the cases the
court considers of greater importance, shall take precedence on the docket over all
other cases and shall be assigned for hearing, trial, or argument at the earliest
practicable date and expedited in every way."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.011 (1994) (pro-
viding that the court will give this proceeding priority over other civil causes to which
priority is not given by other statutes); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:7 (1990) (stating
that "[t]he courts shall give proceedings under this chapter priority on the court
calendar."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.490(2) (Butterworth 1991) (stating that
"[e]xcept as to causes the court considers of greater importance, proceedings... take
precedence on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for hearing and
trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-
9(c) (1990) (stating that "[a]ctions brought under this chapter may be advanced on the
calendar upon motion of the petitioner."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 319(b) (1995) (stating
that "[e]xcept as to cases the court considers of greater importance, proceed-
ings..., and appeals therefrom, take precedence on the docket over all cases and shall
be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument at the earliest practicable date and
expedited in every way."); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346 (Michie 1995) (providing that in
multi-countyjudicial districts outside of regular terms, the hearing on the petition shall
be given precedence on the docket for cases except those given other legal prece-
dence); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-5.(3) (1993) (stating that "[e]xcept as to causes the court
considers of greater importance, proceedings arising under subsection one of this
section shall be assigned for hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date.").
374. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-107(b) (Michie 1992) (explaining that a circuit court
must fix and determine a day for the petition to be heard within seven days of the
application date); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6259(c) (West 1995) (providing that an order of
disclosure is immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court within 20 days
after service of notice of entry of the order); IDAHO CODE § 9-343(1) (1990) (stating
that the court shall set the time for responsive pleadings and hearings within 28
calendar days from date of filing); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-9 (West Supp. 1995)
(establishing specific burdens of proof for agencies and actions challenging denial of
access); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-623(b) (1995) (stating that "defendant shall
serve an answer or otherwise plead to the complaint within 30 days after service of the
complaint."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 17C. (West 1988) (stating that "[t]he
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specificity in dictating procedure would run afoul of the
Minnesota Constitution's explicit separation of powers. Minneso-
ta law recognizes that while the Legislature has the authority to
establish substantive rights of litigants, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has the power "to regulate the pleadings, practice,
procedure, and the forms thereof in civil actions in all courts of
this state, including the probate courts, by rules promulgated by
it from time to time. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify the substantive rights of any litigant."1
75
The use of a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
compliance with the MGDPA avoids encroachment into the
court's province by giving the general directive that the hearing
should commence as early as possible. More importantly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has exempted proceedings under
Minnesota Statutes chapter 586 from their procedural rules.
7 6
The law governing procedure for obtaining a writ of
mandamus is a matter of statutory law only. The law allows the
parties and the court to proceed to a determination on the
question of whether a petitioner is entitled to either an alterna-
tive writ or a peremptory writ depending on whether the
respondent would have any valid excuse for nonperfor-
mance.177  If respondent has a valid excuse for nonperfor-
mance, the court issues an alternative writ and allows the
respondent to answer on the day the writ is returned.
378  If
there is no valid excuse for nonperformance, a preemptive writ
order of notice on the complaint shall be returnable no later than 10 days after the
filing thereof and the complaint shall be heard and determined on the return day or
on such day thereafter as the court shall fix, having regard to the speediest possible
determination of the cause consistent with the rights of the parties."); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 91-A-7 (1990) (declaring that if anyjustice finds time to be of the essence, then
there is authority to issue an ex parte order); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-505(b) (1992)
(stating that "the generally applicable periods of filing such [a] response shall not apply
in the interest of expeditious hearings."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-404.(2)-(3) (1995)
(setting out timelines and deadlines for filing a petition for judicial review and
requirements for the contents of a petition including a directive that all additional
pleadings and proceedings be governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure); VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.1-346 (Michie 1995) (providing that petitions for mandamus or injunction
shall be heard within seven days); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.340(1)-(2). (West
Supp. 1996) (explaining that court may order agency to show cause why it has
disallowed inspection or copying of public records).
375. See sources cited supra note 373.
376. MINN. R. CIv. P. 81.01(a), App. A.
377. MINN. STAT. §§ 586.03-.04 (1994).
378. MINN. STAT. § 586.06 (1994).
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may be issued. 79 Even in the case of an alternative writ, this
remedy affords the parties involved in a dispute concerning
access to government data a timely judicial determination about
whether the person seeking access to government data is entitled
to the access.
Using a petition for a writ of mandamus rather than the
Commissioner's advisory opinions gives a party seeking access to
government data several advantages. First, Minnesota Statutes
chapter 586 allows forjudicial interpretation of the statute rather
than an administrative interpretation,"0 making the decision
more trustworthy and giving it more legal integrity. Second, a
peremptory writ may be issued in a matter of hours rather than
the thirty to fifty days allowed for Commissioner of Administra-
tion opinions."s ' Third, in cases of alternative writs, if the
governmental entity can show cause why the data should not be
released to the person requesting it, the court is in a position to
hold a trial or other proceedings as necessary to establish facts
that are in dispute. 8 The Commissioner of Administration
does not take testimony under oath and may or may not review
relevant documents.
3
A writ of mandamus is not a perfect fit, however. The
discussion of some of the disputes submitted to the Commis-
sioner illustrates well that the official duty may not be clearly
imposed by law. The same data may fall within several categories
that dictate differing rights of access. Specific authority in the
MGDPA to proceed by petition for writ of mandamus under
Minnesota Statutes chapter 586 in an action to compel compli-
379. MINN. STAT. § 586.04 (1994).
380. Id.
381. Compare MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 1 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (describing
required opinions by the Commissioner concerning government data practices) with
MINN. STAT. § 586.04 (1994) (describing difference in allowing preemptory writ as
opposed to alternative writ).
382. MINN. STAT. § 586.12 (1994).
383. See MINN. R. 1205.1600, subp. 1 (referring to Rules of the Office of Administra-
tive Hearings). Two obstacles exist to the use of a writ of mandamus to enforce rights
under the MGDPA. The first is that Minnesota Statutes § 586.10 (1994) sets a
maximum fine of $250 when the court determines that a public officer has neglected
or refused to perform a duty without just cause. It is not clear if this provision would
bar misdemeanor prosecution for a willful violation or the payment of exemplary
damages, both of which are available under the MGDPA. Second, it is not clear to what
extent the right to receive attorney's fees differs between the MGDPA and Minnesota
Statutes chapter 586 governing writs of mandamus.
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ance without the specific showing that the duty is clear would
eliminate this shortcoming.
3 8 4
The writ of mandamus also has other disadvantages when
compared to the Commissioner's advisory opinions, such as its
relatively high cost to the parties. Government entities, for
example, pay $200 for each Commissioner opinion.8 5 Other
parties requesting opinions pay nothing. 6 The MGDPA also
grants immunity from exemplary or compensatory damages or
attorney's fees to any agency that "acts in conformity with a
written opinion."" Removing the specter of damages, costs,
and attorney's fees that could result from an erroneous but good
faith attempt to properly categorize and classify government data
is an incentive to resolve disputes. Another great benefit of
Commissioner's advisory opinions is the consistency that can
come from a centralized decision-making body. As illustrated in
section III.C., the Commissioner's application of the MGDPA has
not been uniform. The concept of a central decision-maker,
however, allows for the removal of much uncertainty in the
interpretation of the MGDPA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The MGDPA's complex and rigid structure has resulted in
many disagreements over how government information should
be classified and to whom it may be released. Minnesota's
MGDPA contains solutions, which do not provide the citizens
individually or collectively (as the government) with consistent,
cost-efficient, and useful solutions to disputes about access to
government data. The Commissioner's advisory opinions could
provide uniform guidance in interpreting the statute throughout
the state by offering consistent opinions about the classification
of data, and providing access to those opinions. The Commis-
384. See MINN. STAT. § 586.01 (1994) (requiring that the duty be specifically found
in the law).
385. MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 3 (1994).
386. See MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subds. 1, 3 (1994) (making no reference to a fee by
other individuals).
387. MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 2 (1994). Costs to the parties may include
attorney's fees. MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 4 (1994). Parties may retain legal counsel
for either type of proceeding. For instance, 28 of the first 50 requests for opinions
from the Commissioner of Administration were from attorneys on behalf of their
clients. In addition, the amount of attorney time would vary greatly depending upon
the complexity of the issues.
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sioner's advisory opinions, unfortunately, have been at times
inconsistent in their approach to classification of data, have
strayed into areas of interpretation not explicitly authorized by
the MGDPA or other statutes, and have involved unnecessary
and unsupported fact-finding.3" The Commissioner is not a
judicial body or legal advisor with skills and expertise in
interpreting a statute. In addition, the statute does not give the
Commissioner the authority to issue opinions that have finali-
ty.Y39 Most importantly, although the Legislature delegated to
the Commissioner of Administration the authority to issue
written opinions about classification of data and rights of parties,
the Commissioner is bound by the complex and rigid structure
of the MGDPA.
390
The MGDPA also provides for judicial determination of the
legal issues of proper classification and access of government
data through what the MGDPA designates as an "action to
compel compliance." 91  This action, if administered as a
petition for a writ of mandamus, provides a solution for disputes
about access to government data. This approach has some
advantages over the Commissioner's opinions because courts
have the charge and expertise of interpreting statutes. A
petition for a writ of mandamus may also be more timely than
the Commissioner's opinions. The MGDPA also provides that a
party disputing a denial of access may bring "an action in district
court seeking release of the data." 92 Presumably, this would
require initiation of a lawsuit through service of a summons and
388. Although Minnesota Statutes § 13.072, subdivision 2 (1994) mandates that the
Commissioner "arrange for public dissemination of opinions," the opinions are not
generally available. Some opinions have been published in Finance & Commerce, a legal
newspaper, but not on a predictable basis. Minnesota's Attorney General Opinions are
published. Most states including Alaska, Kentucky, and Washington publish attorney
general opinions on open records or freedom of information laws. Texas attorney
general opinions are online at [REINSERT WWW ADDRESS].
389. See MINN. STAT. § 13.072, subd. 2 (1994) (providing that decisions are not
binding); Cf. UNIF. INFORMATION PRACTICES CODE, § 4-102(b) (3), 13 U.LA 277 (1986)
(providing optional language for a binding ruling in privacy actions).
390. While the Commissioner has stated that consistent interpretation is of
paramount importance in issuing the opinions, the statute does not give the
Commissioner authority to ignore sections of the MGDPA or change classifications of
data. An agency may not decide the limits of its statutory power. Burlington Northern,
Inc. v. Department of Pub. Serv., 308 Minn. 43, 49, 240 N.W.2d 554, 557 (1976).
391. See MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 4 (1994).
392. See MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 8 (1994).
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complaint.
Without a fundamental change in the structure of the
MGDPA, however, the courts, the Commissioner, and the parties
to any dispute will continue to be hemmed in by the MGDPA
itself. Informal dispute resolution and compromise by the
parties is not possible under the current dictates of the MGDPA.
It costs citizens and government both time and resources when
either the Minnesota Commissioner of Administration or the
courts must be involved in each disagreement over category and
classification of data.
Many different data access procedures in other states
attempt to provide fast, inexpensive methods, that can result in
decisions with integrity. A remedy that combines the centralized,
inexpensive (to the parties) decision-making of the Commission-
er's opinions with the integrity and finality ofjudicial determina-
tions could be fashioned. Many states rely on the attorney
general to issue legal opinions on the open records or freedom
of information statutes. 98 Other states use a commission that
consists of commissioners who are learned in the law and have
the authority to hold fact-finding hearings, if necessary. In
addition, if the determinations are of state-wide significance, they
could be distributed in a uniform, reliable way, assuring their
availability to parties with similar disputes. Finally, appellate
review could be available in those cases where the commission's
decision is dispositive. Many other schemes combining state-wide
consistency (and distribution) with the integrity and finality of
judicial determinations at a reasonable cost to the parties may
exist, and merit discussion at the Legislature.
393. See supra notes 309, 319 and accompanying text.
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